High Court Judge Justice Raulston Glasgow has delivered a judgment in a case that could have far-reaching implications for the conduct of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) for development projects in Grenada.
The judge handed down his ruling in a case brought by Grenada Land Actors Inc against the government-controlled Planning and Development Authority (PDA) of Grenada.
The judge took issue with the EIA done by companies for some of the major projects on the island – Levera Development, Mt Hartman and La Sagesse as raised by Grenada Land Actors (GLA).
He also chided PDA for the manner in which it was handling its business on behalf of the state.
The case attracted a battery of lawyers Leslie Thomas K.C and former high court judge Rita Joseph-Olivetti for GLA. Sydney Bennett K.C, Aleya Williams and Caryn Adams appeared for PDA, John Carrington K.C, Sheila Harris, Anand Ramlogan SC, Gina Dyer Munro and Daniella Williams-Mitchell as well as husband and wife Darshan Ramdhani K.C, and Sabrita Khan-Ramdhani along with Sydni Walker for the other Interested Parties in the case.
As a public service, THE NEW TODAY reproduces in full the Justice Glasgow ruling that can have implications for major development projects on the island:-
[234] There were 2 EIAs submitted to PADA in 2021. The EIA dated March 2021 on the entire project was conducted by Niles and Associates1 and spans 107 pages. In reviewing this EIA, I have found explanations on the type of soil and topography on the site, an extensive summary of the marine life and mangrove ecosystem at the site at the Levera pond and Levera beach. There is also information on the social and economic environment, summaries on the public consultations conducted and the concerns and recommendations made.
[235] The scope of the project was also outlined, showing the initially proposed project and the reduction in size of the new proposal, identification and assessments on the overall project’s impact on the environment and mitigation measures to address those impacts. An environmental management plan was also outlined, addressing the activities of concern, the mitigation measures and who was responsible for performing these measures during the developmental process.
[236] There was also the EIA on the proposed construction of the jetty dated 20th January 2021, which spans 23 pages. I note that an EIA for the jetty was mandatory, falling within a Schedule III type of development under the Act. This EIA outlined the legislative background for this aspect of the project, described the marine and ecological environment, beach dynamics, tides and currents, and coral reefs and species. It also outlined potential environmental impacts and gave recommendations for mitigation of the adverse effects identified.
[237] GLA complains that the Levera EIAs also failed to understand potential issues, propose alternatives and enhance public participation. These are GLA’s opinions and not factual observations. As aforestated, PADA’s actions do not automatically become irrational or unreasonable, simply because GLA’s witnesses would have implemented different mitigation measures or considered additional information or required different types of assessments of the environment. Failing to mention or integrate legislation which GLA surmises is relevant is not a fatal error in the EIAs. PADA as the decision-making body determines the relevancy or irrelevancy of the information to be reviewed in accordance with the Act.
[238] PADA’s evidence is that it considered, in addition to GLA’s own reviews, (which GLA has not challenged), the reports of its own members of staff who deposed to concerns about the project, including the EIAs, and themselves made recommendations and proposed mitigative measures, after examining the documents submitted. These are the actions of prudent planning authorities. PADA has also disclosed to this court that, in addition to the EIAs, there were other documents on which it relied, such as the ‘Wharf Planning and Construction Scheme’ dated 30th December 2020 and the ‘Jetty Plan Feasibility Study Report’ dated October 2021.
[239] GLA also refers to PADA’s indication to Heng Sheng, after approval was granted, that a separate EIA ought to be produced for a desalination plant. GLA asserts that this shows the major failings of the entire Levera EIA and brings the entire approval for development into question. GLA contends that this satisfies the test of Wednesday unreasonableness, as any rational planning authority would immediately recognize that a mega tourism project, complete with a golf course, could not commence or survive, without adequate sources of water.
[240] Respectfully, this submission is logically and legislatively unsound. It must first be noted that a desalination plant is a Schedule III development, which requires an EIA under the Act. If PADA felt that the issue of desalination was not adequately or comprehensively addressed in the overall project EIA, PADA’s request for further documentation or a separate EIA to consider the application falls squarely within its remit under section 21(1) of the Act, which recites that –
“In addition to the information required when submitting an application, the Authority may, request in writing that an applicant provide further information which may be necessary to determine the application.”
[241] I must say a word again about GLA’s approach to this entire affair. As can be seen from the foregoing discourse, GLA entered into almost forensic polemics with PADA and the Interested Parties on the merits of the EIAs and their adequacy throughout this entire claim. Counsels are reminded that these sorts of proceedings are not excursions into the perfection or failings of the planning process.
[242] What would be useful on judicial review exercises regarding planning permission is a succinct description of the project, a concise description of the material that the planning authority considered in arriving at its decisions and a short description of any procedural or substantive legal missteps that may have bedeviled the exercise. Any alternative approach might in an appropriate case be described as an abusive utilization of the court’s supervisory jurisdiction to criticize every single aspect of a document or the process adopted with respect to the planning decision making.
[243] It must also be remembered that while an EIA is an integral part of consideration by PADA when determining the environmental effect of a project, it is not the only consideration. Furthermore, one must appreciate that it is unrealistic to expect that an EIA will contain information on every conceivable matter affecting the environment. This does not however mean that PADA is permitted to act with wanton disregard of relevant information, as section 22(7) of the Act outlines what material considerations are for PADA’s assessment purposes.
[244] This brings me to the only portion of GLA’s complaint with respect to the Levera development that I consider to be meritorious. I accept PADA’s submission that the golf course is not a Schedule III project for which an EIA is mandated. However, GLA’s complaint that the EIA for the overall Levera project “…says little about the golf course and its impacts, and no reasonable authority could have considered it an adequate assessment of the potential impacts of the golf course in this sensitive location” is also of concern to me.
245] As stated in Preston New Road Action Group (through Holliday) v Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and others, “..An equally robust principle is that an environmental statement is not expected to include more information than is reasonably required to assess the likely significant environmental effects of the development proposed, in the light of the current knowledge.”
[246] From the review of the disclosure, I find that the golf course was proposed in an environmentally sensitive area and holes were destined to be positioned on or near the beach. According to the re-design, this area was a known nesting area for endangered turtles and a popular public recreation area. The Niles EIA does little to mention any potential environmental impacts that may be occasioned by the placement of the golf course or recommend any mitigation on adverse environmental impact. This was striking, even when considering that the size of the golf course was reduced to a smaller footprint than was originally proposed.
[247] Upon review of the Levera EIAs and other reports disclosed to this court, the issue of potential environmental impact on the golf course has been found wanting. There are only scant mentions of the failed golf course project in the early 2000s, in the Levera Report of March 2021, and in reports from 1988. There were equally other documents before PADA which raised concerns about the golf course aspect of the project. Given that the prior material mentioned the challenges with the golf course project proposed by the prior developer in the 2000s, which was later abandoned, the Levera EIA ought to have comprehensively addressed this issue and made recommendations for mitigation. In considering the totality of the circumstances and the documentation before PADA, a reasonable planning authority would have observed that the proposed golf course, even when reduced, required further scrutiny and investigation. The potential effects of the golf course on the environment have not been presented to this court in any material way. Strikingly, the EIA merely provides the proposed location for the golf course.
[248] As the Levera project was designed and proposed in phases, the issue of the golf course does not impugn the entirety of the project, as it was considered and approved through a separate application. However, outside of the golf course, this court finds that PADA acted prudently and as a planning authority ought to have acted with respect to the Levera development. There is nothing in the circumstances that suggests that what PADA did was so unreasonable or in defiance of logic that no reasonable planning authority would have decided to grant planning permission for the temporary workers quarters or the entire Levera project. I will address the appropriate remedy for PADA’s failings with the golf course later in this ruling.
THE LA SAGESSE PROJECT
[249] In its claim, GLA challenges PADA’s 29th January 2020 decision to grant planning permission for the La Sagesse project on the grounds that it was irrational and unlawful because inter alia –
(1) PADA failed to protect the natural and cultural heritage of Grenada by allowing the development to hamper public rights of access to the beach, destroy vegetation and partially backfill the salt pond;
(2) A proper and comprehensive EIA assessment was not completed.
[250] GLA claims that Range’s EIA was inadequate, and that no reasonable planning authority would have relied on it. GLA raises these challenges in Dr. Daniel and Mr. Joseph – Witzig’s evidence, and detailed these perceived shortcomings in GAEA’s La Sagesse report. Before examining GLA’s challenges to Range’s project through the EIAs, it seems to be quite a stretch to say that PADA failed in its duties by allowing the developer to destroy vegetation.
[251] Range’s notice of approval in principle was granted on 28th February 2019 and was subject to several conditions which included the submission of an EIA. Final approval was thereafter granted, which also contained several conditions. PADA’s evidence and that of Mr. Shehada on this issue is that after approval was granted some vegetation was destroyed in error by a subcontractor.
[252] PADA’s evidence as recounted by Mr. Frederick and Mr. Jeremiah is that upon being notified of the breach, PADA immediately requested that the destruction stop.
Such an order was well within PADA’s statutory remit. Mitigation measures were proposed and were in fact implemented by Range to address the error, through Range’s replanting of vegetation in specified areas. This is not a case where PADA did nothing to stop the developer from its illegal action. On the contrary, PADA’s unrefuted evidence is that it visited the site, observed the wrongdoing done and established and ensured that mitigation measures were imposed and enforced. These are the actions of an active and aware planning authority.
[253] GLA has also alleged that PADA allowed Range to backfill the salt pond illegally. However, I will attach no weight to these assertions, as there is no objective evidence proving that these assertions are anything other than GLA’s opinion. Further, Mr. Shehada’s evidence on this point was not challenged at trial.
[254] GLA also contends that Range’s EIA was so inadequate that PADA’s reliance on it to grant permission is Wednesbury unreasonable, and the decision ought to be quashed. It must be remembered that an EIA is not the only document which PADA is required to consider before granting permission. The court’s review of Range’s EIA dated June 2019, which spans 89 pages was found to be quite comprehensive in its assessment of the environmental considerations with respect to the naturally occurring fauna, the geology of the area, drainage concerns, social and economic considerations and constraints, and its predictions on environmental impacts. It also included mitigation measures and outlined recommendations for environmental monitoring and management throughout the totality of the project.
[255] The evidence also shows that PADA had other documentation to consider in addition to the EIA, such as Range’s Concept Design, Mechanical Report, Structural Concept Design Report, Range Development Site Accommodation and Batching Plant Report, NAWASA Laboratory Test Reports149, Project proposal for the La Sagesse Archaeology Project, and Quantitative Benthic Reconnaissance and Marine Study among other studies.
[256] Minutes of meeting with PADA concerning Range’s project were also disclosed, which showed PADA’s consideration of the documentation submitted by Range for the project, reports from the Chief Forestry Officer to PADA and EIAC minutes of meetings on Range’s development. I do not find that I agree with GLA that the EIA was so defective that no planning authority would rely on it or that it was unreasonable for PADA to rely on any of the aforesaid documents referred to above to inform whether permission should be granted.
[257] However, as with the Levera project, I do share some of GLA’s concerns with respect to the EIA’s apparent deficiencies with respect to the environmental concerns and challenges where the lagoon enhancement approval is concerned. The evidence is that the La Sagesse lagoon is a protected area, but the overall project EIA fails to treat with the lagoon in any comprehensive way by identifying any adverse environmental impacts and making recommendations for mitigation of these said effects.
[258] I do note that the issue of the lagoon featured heavily as an area of concern by PADA as noted in its conditional approval. This is buttressed by the fact that PADA proposed several mitigation measures in relation to the lagoon in its approval. In PADA’s evidence, reference is made to a separate EIA being submitted to PADA with respect to the enhancement of the lagoon. Ms. St. Louis’ witness summary recites the date of this subsequent EIA as 23rd November 2020.
[259] From the minutes of the EIAC meeting held on 12th January 2021, reference is again made to an EIA for the lagoon. However, I have reviewed Range and PADA’s disclosures and both disclosures only reference the EIA dated June 2019 for the La Sagesse development. It would therefore appear that this separate EIA for the lagoon enhancement was not disclosed for the court’s review. GLA has complained about the lack of disclosure by PADA throughout the course of these proceedings, and if there was in fact a subsequent EIA done for the lagoon enhancement after the overall EIA conducted in 2019, this is a glaring failing by PADA.
[260] Without this separate EIA being disclosed for the court’s review and commentary, I am left with the EIA dated June 2019 which does not comprehensively address the environmental impacts of the lagoon. I do note the plans for lagoon enhancement, ‘Proposal for Lagoon Enhancement’ Report dated 21st July 2020 and the ‘Lagoon Enhancement Assessment’ dated 16th September 2020 were in fact disclosed, but I am constrained to agree with GLA about the lack of qualitative information on the lagoon’s environmental impact and mitigation measures within these documents.
[261] Had the separate EIA been disclosed by PADA, my findings on the lagoon may have been different, but in the absence of disclosure, I cannot speculate that this separate EIA was comprehensive in the Prineas sense by outlining the environmental impact of the lagoon’s development or made recommendations on mitigating any adverse impacts attendant on the proposed developments of the lagoon.
[262] Planning authorities must ensure that they comply with their statutory and court ordered mandates on these matters to avoid these results. The appropriate remedy for this issue of the lagoon solely will be addressed in the remedies portion of this decision. As with the Levera development, outside of the sole issue of the lagoon, I find that PADA acted prudently and within its remit in granting planning permission for the project.
THE MT. HARTMAN PROJECT
[263] GLA challenges PADA’s October 2019 decision to grant planning permission for the Mt. Hartman development. It is claimed that the decisions were unlawful and irrational because permission was granted prior to the completion of an updated EIA by JECO Caribbean in contravention of section 22(3) of the Act. Further, GLA claims that PADA did not consider all relevant matters as required by sections 3 and 22(3) of the Act, making the decision to grant permission unreasonable.
[264] GLA also asks the court to order that the application should be reconsidered and PADA should –
(1) Hold consultations with the Natural and Cultural Heritage Advisory Committee;
(2) Ensure that a comprehensive EIA proces is done which addresses marine surveys and surveys of the Grenada dove population, wetland habitat and mangrove species;
(3) Ensure that mitigation measures of public access to the beach, limitation of negative effects of development on the Grenada dove sanctuary, the Mt. Hartman national park, the Woburn/ Clarkes Court Bay Marina are done; and
(4) Enforce recommendations made by the EIA for the Mt. Hartman project.
[265] The Mt Hartman;s application to PDA for planning permission begin with an application for approval first made in September 2015 for development of ‘Phase O’ of the project. Phase O was comprised of building operations for a showroom, lobby and interpretative centre, lounge and bar, dining room, kitchen, office, villas and conference rooms and a swimming pool. This application was made by a previous developer in 2015. A master plan report dated 24th July 2015 accompanied that application.
[266] It is important to note that the current Act was not in force at the time of the application. An Environmental Impact Statement was thereafter submitted to PADA by JECO Caribbean dated 14th December 2015 and conditional approval in principle was granted to that developer on 1st December 2016. The application was resubmitted by the current developer, due to the lapse in time between approval and development. This application was approved by PADA in principle on 30th October 2019.
[267] GLA’s plethora of challenges with the project are outlined in its Hartman EIA review, but its main grouse seems to be that in GLA’s opinion, PADA ought not to have granted approval in October 2019 until it received a completed updated EIA. GLA cites section 22(3) of the Act as mandating that planning permission ought not to be granted, unless the EIA report had first been considered. Looking at the totality of the circumstances of Mt. Hartman’s development, GLA’s complaint here seems overly pedantic. This is not a case where PADA granted approval without consideration of an EIA, and as already established, reliance on a prior EIA is not unlawful under the Act.
[268] Even if not called an EIA by name, section 3 of the Act outlines what an EIA must contain, and the case law is clear that if the document is comprehensive in its treatment, it will satisfy the requirements of the law. As found by Lord Hoffman in Berkeley v Secretary of State for the Environment –
“…An EIA by any other name will do as well. But it must in substance be an EIA…”167 (bold emphasis mine)
[269] The 2015 Master Plan report outlines that it is a preliminary assessment of the proposed development and spans 39 pages. It addresses the proposed plans for Phase O of the project with respect to water, sewerage, electricity, gas, cooling and telecommunications and also outlines potential challenges in implementing Phase O. Proposals are outlined for electricity and transportation challenges highlighted in accessibility to roads in the area, and the report itself acknowledges that an EIA will be needed to make further determinations on the environmental impacts of the entire project.
[270] The Environmental Impact Statement dated 14th December 2015 as prepared by JECO Caribbean spans 20 pages, and details the environmental impact of Phase O, in comparison to the 2015 Master Plan report. The EIS states that the report is with respect to Phase O of the project, which is preparatory to the full development plan, and details surveys that are to be conducted for the Grenada Dove sanctuary, improvements to site access, geotechnical surveys for potable water, construction and operational waste management and utilities. The report describes the physical environment, details the dominant vegetation and associated fauna, and outlines the environmental impacts and mitigation measures for several matters such as drainage, terrestrial and marine plant life, noise regulation and transportation.
[271] Similar to the Levera development, PADA’s evidence is that these aforementioned reports were some of previous reports submitted to PADA for the area. These reports, along with physical assessments and inspections by stakeholders, were considered when determining whether to grant approval in October 2019. It is also noteworthy that when PADA granted its approval in principle, it attached conditions to this approval, one such condition being the updating of the EIA for the project. Mr. Frederick’s letter of 28th December 2020 to the Vice Chairman of the Hartman development outlined that an updated EIA was required, and that the EIA was to be submitted for review, along with the final application for the project.
[272] Also similar to the Levera development, the approval granted in 2019 was based on PADA’s assessment of the preparatory works needed in Phase O towards the final project. As found in Belize Alliance of Conservation Non- Governmental Organizations v The Department of the Environment (No 2), the grant of planning permission is not the final or last opportunity to exercise control over a project, as environmental control is recognized by the courts to be part of an iterative process. PADA’s decision to grant conditional approval based on existing reports, while awaiting a more comprehensive report was a matter within the planning authority’s judgment to make, and was not unlawful or, without more, unreasonable. PADA made this decision acknowledging that further information was required and that final approval would be considered after the submission of this documentation.
[273] It also does not follow that PADA’s request for an updated EIA meant that the previous EIS or the Master Report previously submitted were deficient in their findings, proposals and recommendations. The Act allows PADA as the decision maker to determine whether it had sufficient information, and if it found that it did not, it was well within its remit to request that information under section 21 (1) of the Act.
[274] It also does not follow that PADA had to await the updated EIA in order to grant approval. This reasoning was affirmed by the Privy Council in Fishermen and Friends of the Sea v Environmental Management Authority and Others (Trinidad and Tobago). In this case, Lord Carnwath SCJ reasoned –
“The power to impose conditions on a CEC is in terms unlimited. There is no reason why it should not include an updated EIA. This does not in itself establish the inadequacy of the earlier EIA or of the other information on which the grant was based. Nor does the English case relied on lay down any general rule to that effect.”
I see no reason to depart from this learning, and I can find no unlawful or unreasonable act by the PADA by granting conditional approval to Mt. Hartman while awaiting an updated EIA.
[275] Turning to GLA’s review of the Mt. Hartman project dated 20th February 2024, GLA challenges the EIS and updated EIA, outlining that statistics are inaccurate, data is insufficient, bird species are underestimated, and inadequate mitigation measures were identified to offset habitat loss. Upon my own review of these documents and the updated Mt. Hartman EIA, GLA again has undertaken a seemingly overly forensic review of the data presented to prove the inadequacy of the EIA. Most of the information contained in that report is the authors’ opinions on the data presented and challenges the merits of PADA’s decisions, based on GLA’s own self asserted knowledge and assessments of the area.
[276] The updated EIA prepared by JECO Caribbean Inc dated January 2021 is more comprehensive than the aforementioned Master plan report and EIS, spanning 226 pages. Upon review of this document, I find that substantively, it fits within the case law of being an EIA, outlining environmental impacts and proposing mitigation measures on issues such as air quality, plant life, natural resources, transportation, utilities and social and human implications of the development.
[277] The EIA also addresses marine life, contains a dove management plan and addresses water and desalination. I find that there was a comprehensive assessment on the issue of desalination, keeping in mind that Schedule III of the Act requires an EIA where water and desalination is concerned. Given the comprehensive assessment and treatment of water and desalination within the EIA, I find that PADA acted prudently and reasonably to grant planning permission in this regard.
[278] To further address GLA’s complaints about PADA’s decision on the entire project, disclosures by PADA of its minutes of the meeting of 22nd December 2021 also show that PADA transmitted the EIA report submitted by JECO Caribbean in January 2021 to the EIA Committee which was engaged to review it1. The EIA Committee wrote to PADA on 26th January 2022 outlining that a meeting was held on 26th January 2022 to deliberate on the report, and having reviewed it, the EIA Committee found that the report addressed issues previously raised by the EIA Committee, and found that the project would not adversely affect the natural environment, once the recommendations of the EIA Committee and the EIA report were followed. This correspondence also highlighted that any further development may require the receipt of an updated EIA, in keeping with new proposals.
[279] I have also read the extensive documentary evidence with respect to the Hartman development, such as the report by CEO for the Board on the Mt. Hartman development, minutes of meetings held with Hartman, site inspection reports done by representatives of Hartman and PADA EIA Committee, memorandums to PADA Board on requests for clearance of 2 lots of land, communications from PADA to Hartman on changes to the Master plan, minutes of PADA dealing with Hartman, and memorandums from the EIA Committee to PADA’s Board on the Mt. Hartman development. The totality of this material suggests, and I so find, that PADA acted within the confines of the law by considering the material before it and determining what decisions ought to be made for mitigation of environmental impacts and in compliance with the Act.
[280] GLA’s complaint about lack of consultation with the National and Cultural Heritage Advisory Committee and lack of comprehensive EIAs are found to be without merit with respect to the Hartman project. Whether PADA determines that it wishes for itself or a developer to engage with any named body is a matter for PADA solely. The court’s role is to assess the lawfulness and reasonableness of the planning authority’s actions and not an assessment of the merits of decisions taken or not taken.
[281] It must be remembered that the court is not responsible for enforcing best practices or prescribing how PADA ought to oversee or govern development. The court’s task is to ensure that the way the decision was made is proper, not with the merits of the decision itself. This court is not tasked with venturing into the office of policy makers to determine the policies with respect to development. It is not for this court to ensure that the developer puts measures in place to maintain public access to the beach, limit negative effects on the species and fauna in the development or enforce recommendations made by the EIA. These are matters for the planning authority to ensure are properly done. I find no basis in law upon which to interfere with the Hartman project and thus I decline the reliefs sought by GLA in this regard.
WHETHER GLA HAS STANDING TO BRING THIS CLAIM;
[282] The issue of GLA’s standing, or its lack thereof, is also ripe for determination at this stage. From inception, PADA and the Interested Parties have vigorously maintained that GLA lacks the requisite standing to bring this claim. GLA has equally strenuously insisted that it has the requisite standing.
Range’s take on standing
[283] Range attacked the issue of GLA’s standing most frontally on three grounds:
(1) GLA did not exist when the decision was made to grant Range planning permission;
(2) GLA’smembers possess no persona linterests in the developments as contemplated by rule 56.2 CPR; and
(3) GLA’s incorporation to pursue litigation cannot give them standing which they did not previously possess.
Range claims that the interests of an incorporated association are distinct from the interests of persons in an unincorporated association and that persons without an interest cannot join together and incorporate themselves and thereafter claim an interest.
GLA’s views on standing
[284] GLA addressed Range’s concerns by placing reliance on Residents against Waste Site v Lancashire County Council and the recent Privy Council’s ruling in John Mussington and Another v Development Control Authority and others, highlighting that GLA, through its members plainly have knowledge or concern for the subject matter and have a genuine interest in the fate of Grenada’s flora, fauna and ecosystem. GLA also insists that the date of its incorporation is irrelevant, as Dr. Daniel and Mr. Joseph – Witzig have standing as individuals. GLA asserts that these individuals engaged with PADA and the Interested Parties prior to incorporation in their capacity as GLA’s alter ego.
My take on the standing issue
[285] I note that the Court of Appeal’s decision in Mussington191 was relied on heavily by the Interested Parties in this court and in the subsequent appeal. In our apex court, Lord Boyd reasoned that our Court of Appeal in Mussington had taken too narrow an approach on the issue of standing and acknowledged that a broad interpretation is to be accorded –
“The Eastern Caribbean CPR r 56.2 provides a very liberal and relaxed test of standing in judicial review proceedings: Attorney General v Martinus Francois (“Francois”) Civil Appeal No. 37 of 2003 per Rawlins JA at para 152. All that applicants require to show is that they have “sufficient interest” in the subject matter: CPR r 56.2(1). CPR r 56.2(2) contains a non – exhaustive list of persons who will be accorded standing.” (bold emphasis mine)
[286] Lord Boyd referenced dicta from Jamadar vs Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago quoting from Walton and AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate that the permissive approach to standing in public interest litigation and the considerations for the court are as follows –
(i) “Standing goes to jurisdiction and is to be determined in the legal and factual context of each case. It is a matter of judicial discretion.
(ii) The merits of the challenge and the nature of the breach raised are important considerations.
(iii) The value in vindicating the rule of law (the principle of legality) is a significant consideration.
(iv) The importance of the issue raised.
(v) The public interest benefit in having the issue raised and determined.
(vi) The bona fides and competence of the applicant to raise the issues.
(vii) Whether the applicant is directly affected by, or has a genuine and serious interest and has demonstrated a credible engagement in relation to the issue raised.
(viii) The capacity of the applicant to effectively litigate the issues raised. Whether the action commenced is a reasonable and effective means by which the courts can determine the issues raised.
(x) The imperative to be vigilant so as to prevent an abuse of process by busybodies and frivolous and vexatious litigation.
(xi) Whether the issues raised are a general or specific grievance and whether there are other challengers who are more directly impacted by the decision challenged, or more competent to litigate it.
(xii) The availability and allocation of judicial resources.”
TO BE CONTINUED

