Former Grenada Attorney-General Jimmy Bristol, KC has scored a major victory in getting a member of the Court of Appeal to step down from office on the grounds that his appointment was unconstitutional.
Bristol, who served under the 2008-13 National Democratic Congress (NDC) Congress government of Tillman Thomas, won his case brought against the Court of Appeal Justice Eddy Ventose.
High Court Judge Raulston Glasgow who served for many years in Grenada before his transfer to Anguilla a few weeks ago delivered his ruling in Bristol’s favour which is a major blow to the Court of Appeal.
Justice Glasgow declared that Ventose was not qualified to be appointed as a Judge of the Court of Appeal and declared his appointment to be unconstitutional, null and void and of no effect.
According to one senior local lawyer, the consequence in law of Glasgow’s ruling is that there is now a vacancy in the Court of Appeal for a Justice and that Ventose’s appointment should be treated as if it never happened.
As a public service, THE NEW TODAY reproduces in full the Glasgow ruling on the Ventose matter: –
[1] GLASGOW, J.: The present ruling follows this Court’s decision dated 12th December 2025 concerning an application brought by the Interested Party, Justice Ventose (hereafter “Justice Ventose”). In that application, Justice Ventose challenged the Court’s jurisdiction to hear this the substantive claim instituted by the Claimant, Mr. Bristol (hereafter “Mr. Bristol”). In the 12th December 2025 jurisdictional challenge, this Court held that it possesses jurisdiction to hear and determine Mr. Bristol’s claim.
[2] The factual and procedural background to the issues arising in this matter is set out in detail in the 12th December 2025 ruling. Accordingly, this judgment will refer to the relevant facts only to the extent necessary to explain and determine the issues presently before me. Readers seeking a more comprehensive account of the factual background are referred to the 12th December 2025 ruling.
The case
[3] For present purposes, a brief statement of the relevant constitutional and legislative framework will suffice. Grenada is one of nine Member States and Territories of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean States, (hereafter “OECS”), that share a common superior court, namely the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court, (hereafter “ECSC”). A fuller account of the history of the ECSC is set out in the 12th December 2025 ruling and need not be repeated here. The constitutions of the participating OECS States and Territories1 contain materially similar provisions relating to the ECSC, which is established by legislation known as the Supreme Court Order (hereafter “the Courts Order”). Section 4 of the Courts Order establishes the Court.
[4] Section 5 of the Courts Order (hereafter “section 5”) sets out criteria for appointing the judges of the ECSC which criteria include the appointment of judges who sit on the Court of Appeal. Section 5 reads –
“(1) The Chief Justice shall be appointed by Her Majesty by Letters Patent and the Justices of Appeal and the Puisne Judges shall be appointed on behalf of Her Majesty by the Judicial and Legal Services Commission.
(2) A person shall not be qualified to be appointed—
(a) as Chief Justice or a Justice of Appeal unless—
(i) he has been for a period or periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than five years a judge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from such a court; or
(ii) he is qualified to practise as an advocate in such a court, and has so practised, for a period of, or periods amounting in the aggregate to, not less than fifteen years;
(b) as a Puisne Judge unless—
(i) he is or has been a judge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from such a court; or
(ii) he is qualified to practise as an advocate in such a court and has so practised, for a period of or periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than ten years.
(3) For the purposes of subsection (2) of this section references in that subsection to a period or periods during which a person has practised as an advocate in any such court as is mentioned in that subsection shall be construed as including a period or periods during which a person—
(a) has been serving in the office of judge of any such court; or
(b) after having become qualified to practise as an advocate in any such court, has been serving in a public office in some part of the Commonwealth the functions of which include ‘appearing as an advocate in any such court or in the office of magistrate, or registrar of a court, in some part of the Commonwealth.” (Bold emphasis mine)
The controversy
[5] All parties agree that Justice Ventose has not “… been for a period or periods amounting in the aggregate to not less than five years a judge of a court of unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from such a court.”2 Consequently, as will become apparent later in this judgment, the central issue is whether Justice Ventose’s appointment was made in accordance with the requirements prescribed by section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Courts Order. More specifically, the dispute brings into sharp focus the meaning and scope of the terms “advocate” and “has so practised” as they appear in section 5(2)(a)(ii).
[6] Section 18 of the Courts Order establishes the Judicial and Legal Services Commission (hereafter “the JLSC”), the first defendant to these proceedings, while section 5 confers upon the JLSC the responsibility for appointing judges to the High Court and the Court of Appeal.
[7] Mr. Bristol’s case is that the JLSC acted unlawfully and in breach of section 5 when it appointed Justice Ventose to the Court of Appeal on 8th January 2024. According to Mr. Bristol, Justice Ventose had not “so practised” as an advocate for the requisite period of fifteen years at the time of his appointment. It therefore falls to this Court to examine the basis upon which Mr. Bristol presents that concern.
[8] The JLSC maintains the contrary position. It stands by its decision, asserting that it complied with section 5(2)(a)(ii) by satisfying itself that Justice Ventose had practised as an advocate for the prescribed period of fifteen years prior to his appointment to the Court of Appeal. Justice Ventose, for his part, aligns himself with the JLSC’s stance. He firmly declares that he satisfied the fifteen-year practice requirement stipulated by section 5(2)(a)(ii) and that, consequently, the JLSC lawfully appointed him to the office of Justice of Appeal.
Elaborating the disputations
(i) Mr. Bristol
[9] Mr. Bristol begins from the premise that section 5(2)(a)(ii) of the Constitution refers to an “advocate” without defining who qualifies as an advocate for the purposes of that provision. This interpretive difficulty is not, however, insurmountable. Mr. Bristol argues that guidance as to the meaning of the term “advocate” may be found in its traditional definition as “a legal practitioner whose specific focus is the representation of clients involved in litigation, generally in adversarial proceedings before courts or tribunals.”He relies on A Concise Law Dictionary, A Dictionary of English Law and the case of Medclaf v Mardell as authorities for this proposition. Mr. Bristol presents section 42 of the United Kingdom’s Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 as offering a definition of…”advocacy” in the context of judicial qualifications and professional experience as the exercise of a right of audience before a court, tribunal, or other person.”
[10] Mr. Bristol further argues that, in England and Wales, advocacy was historically the preserve of barristers. By contrast, the legal profession in the Caribbean, and particularly in the Eastern Caribbean, is fused, with all attorneys-at-law enjoying rights of audience before the courts. Nevertheless, he maintains that the Courts Order continues to recognize a distinction between advocates and non-advocates. To support this position, he refers to the decision of the Malaysian Federal Court in Badan Peguam Malaysia v Kerajaan Malaysia, where the Court considered the distinction between barristers and solicitors in interpreting constitutional provisions that employed the term “advocate.” The court in that case observed that
“…We see that, even though the term ‘advocate and solicitor’ is used in the Ordinance, the drafters of the Constitution chose the word ‘advocate’ when drafting the Constitution. True that the Ordinance did not define the word ‘advocate’ even though the word ‘solicitor’ was defined. Both are terms peculiar to the English legal profession. An advocate conducts cases in court. A solicitor does not.
Bearing in mind the background of the members of the Reid Commission that drafted the Constitution, it could well be that they were influenced by the position in England where, until very recently, only advocates were appointed as judges, not solicitors, even though in the then Malaya and until now we have a joint profession.”
[11] Mr. Bristol advances the same analysis in relation to the Grenada Constitution. He argues that the drafters of the Grenada Constitution, as well as those of the Constitutions of the independent member states of the OECS, were persons skilled in English law and therefore they intentionally chose the term “advocate.” In his submission, that choice of language was deliberate and was intended to restrict the category of persons eligible for appointment as judges of the Court of Appeal to those who are advocates in the sense outlined above. Mr. Bristol further elucidates that –
“[F]or the purposes of proving the qualifying period of practice of advocacy required by Section 5 (2) of the Courts Order, an applicant must show more than the date from which he was qualified to practice advocacy. He must have “…so practiced… for a period of, or periods amounting in the aggregate to, not less than fifteen years”.
[12] Mr.Bristol further explains that –
(1) Legal practice involves many aspects of which advocacy is only one aspect. Thus it is quite possible to practise law without being engaged in litigation. Non litigation services performed by a lawyer may include “…conveyancing, provision of corporate, financial or other advisory services”11. In this regard enrollment to practise law as an advocate only proves that you are so qualified to do. It does not prove that you have actually practised as an advocate;
(2) Prior to the fusing of the profession, barristers and solicitors engaged in differing aspects of litigation. Solicitors engaged in litigation management but were precluded from appearing before the courts. This would mean that the lawyer who is engaged in litigation preparation or management, even if that engagement is substantial, would not be considered an advocate;
(3) The term advocate is traditionally understood to be restricted to those who are presenting a client’s case to the court. The meaning of the term does not extend to those “…providing written advice to clients, writing opinions, drafting pleadings, or other litigation support work, if these activities do not directly involve appearing before or addressing a court.”;
(4) The distinction between a lawyer who serves as an advocate and one who serves as a legal consultant or advisor lies “…in the specific legal entitlements and activities associated with advocacy, such as rights of audience and conducting litigation, which are not inherent to the role of a legal consultant or advisor. Consultancy or advisory work typically involves providing legal advice or opinions without engaging in the formal representation of a client in court or exercising rights of audience. Advocacy, on the other hand, specifically involves representing a client in legal proceedings and exercising rights of audience”;
(5) Since agreements for consultancy services vary, it would be difficult to discern, without proof of the contents of the agreement, what sorts of services were offered by Justice Ventose to Finnistere and Associates and whether those services were written advocacy on behalf of a litigant in court;
(6) JLSC is misguided in its approach to the interpretation of section 5(2) (a)( ii) since that “…view does not align with the traditional understanding of advocacy as involving active representation in court proceedings”.
(7) Notwithstanding the fusing of the profession, “[T]he effect of this development is not to change the fundamental nature of the practise of advocacy but to expand the pool of persons permitted to exercise the right of audience before the courts to include all practitioners. In so far as they practise advocacy practitioners are bound by pretty much the same principles, standards and rules as were applicable to advocates in the courts prior to fusion.” As such the definition of “practise as an advocate” cannot be adjusted to mean anything other than its traditional definition;
(8) Section 5(2)(a)(ii) is a deliberate legislative mechanism which “… clearly delineates the qualifications for judicial appointments, including the requirement for a minimum period of service as a judge or advocate.”16 This deliberate legislative approach may be observed in the constitutional provisions of other former and present British territories concerning the establishment of superior courts and the qualifications for judicial office. The British Antarctic Territory (1965) and Gibraltar (1969), for example, adopted provisions governing appointment to their Courts of Appeal during a period broadly analogous to that in which the OECS Constitutions were drafted. Those provisions did not require actual practise as an advocate; rather, they required only a prescribed number of years’ standing. Consequently, eligibility extended to persons whose legal experience had been acquired in circumstances in which they may have been unable to practise before the courts or had not obtained a practising certificate;
(9) The framers of the Courts Order could have easily adopted the approach of the British Antarctic Territory and Gibraltar. However, they deliberately took the policy approach that the applicant must have practised as an advocate. “Their decision to require candidates for the higher judiciary to “practise as an advocate” in the traditional sense of that term, for the minimum period of 15 years represents the choice to adopt a particular model for the establishment and organization of the Courts in the Eastern Caribbean. That decision was that judges would continue to be appointed exclusively from among attorneys who practiced and were familiar with the rules of advocacy and court procedure”. “The policy objective was to ensure that the Courts were staffed with judges who by reason of practise over a multiyear period had gained familiarity with rules of evidence and procedure and adequate insight and experience in the conduct of adversary proceedings in the courts”;
(10) Even if the court accepts the JLSC and Justice Ventose’s approach to interpreting section 5(2) (a) (ii), the facts of this case do not demonstrate that Justice Ventose “…practiced advocacy for the period of 15 years within the meaning and intendment of the Courts Order.” The JLSC could not, therefore “…rationally have accepted that Professor Ventose had satisfied the requirements Section 5(2) of the Courts Order given the information that had been provided to it by Professor Ventose in the course of his application.”
[13] Mr. Bristol next relies on the constitutional arrangements of the British Antarctic Territory and Gibraltar to reinforce his construction of section 5(2)(a)(ii), and in particular his submission that the provision contemplates actual practise as an advocate. He points to section 3 of the British Antarctic Territory Court of Appeal Order 1965 (SI 1965/590), which sets out the qualifications required for appointment as President of the Court or as a Justice of Appeal in that Territory –
“Constitution of Court
(b) a person shall not be qualified for appointment as the President or a Justice of Appeal of the Court unless—
(i) he is, or has been, a judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or in the Republic of Ireland, or a court having jurisdiction in appeals from any such court; or
(ii) he is entitled to practise as an advocate in such a court and has been entitled for not less than five years to practise as an advocate or a solicitor in such a court.
(c) for the purposes of this paragraph, a person shall be regarded as entitled to practise as an advocate or a solicitor if he has been called, enrolled or otherwise admitted as such (and has not subsequently been disbarred or removed from the roll of advocates or solicitors) notwithstanding that—
(i) he holds or acts in any office the holder of which is, by reason of his office, precluded from practising in a court; or
(ii) he does not hold a practising certificate or has not satisfied any other like condition of his being permitted to practise.”
[14] Similar provisions are found in section 58 of the Gibraltar Constitution Order 1969 (23/5/1969) –
“58 Appointment of judges
(1) The Chief Justice, the President of the Court of Appeal and the Justices of Appeal shall be appointed by the Governor in pursuance of instructions given by Her Majesty through a Secretary of State.
(2) No person shall be qualified for appointment as Chief Justice, President of the Court of Appeal or Justice of Appeal unless—
(a) he is, or has been, a judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal in some part of the Commonwealth or in the Republic of Ireland, or of a court having jurisdiction in appeals from any such court; or (b) he is entitled to practise as an advocate in such a court and has been entitled for not less than ten years to practise as an advocate or as a solicitor in such a court.
(3) For the purposes of this section, a person shall be regarded as entitled to practise as an advocate or, as the case may be, as a solicitor if he has been called, enrolled or otherwise admitted as such (and has not subsequently been disbarred or removed from the roll of advocates or, as the case may be, of solicitors) notwithstanding that—
(a) he holds or acts in any office the holder of which is, by reason of his office, precluded from practising in a court; or
(b) he does not hold a practising certificate or has not satisfied any other like condition of his being permitted to practise.”
[15] Mr. Bristol finds the distinction with the Courts Order to be that section 5(2)(a)(ii) “…requires a candidate to have qualified for the bench by the duration of his or her actual practice of advocacy rather than the length of the period for which he or she was entitled to practice is clear from the requirement that the practice of advocacy be … for a period of, or periods amounting in the aggregate to, not less than fifteen years.” The Courts Order, in section 5(3), contemplates “…that there may be periods in which a person is not engaged in the practice of advocacy despite being qualified to do so. It is thus the aggregate number of years of actual advocacy rather than the years during which the applicant was entitled to practice as an advocate which is required.”
Applying the foregoing to the facts of this case, Mr. Bristol argues that the question for the JLSC was not the length of the period in which Justice Ventose was engaged in the practice of law nor the time that elapsed from the time of his call to the Bar. Rather, the JLSC was tasked with enquiring whether Justice Ventose actually practised as an advocate subsequent to his call to the Bar. This is since it is quite possible to be called to the Bar as an attorney at law and not practise as an advocate “…in the sense of carrying on the activity of exercising the right of audience before a court or tribunal on behalf of some person other than himself or herself or, indeed, …offering himself on hazard to take work as an advocate.23” It was for Justice Ventose to so satisfy the JLSC that he had “… for a period aggregating not less than 15 years, practised as an advocate in a court of unlimited jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth.”
(ii) Mr. Bristol on whether Justice Ventose has actually practised as an advocate
[16] Mr. Bristol then examines the evidence that, in his submission, formed the basis of Justice Ventose’s application to the JLSC. Permit me to recite in full paragraphs 25 to 31 of the submissions filed on 17th April 2026 on this issue –
“25.The primary evidence was provided by Professor Ventose in 3 documents:
(a)His application to the JLSC Dated the 27th June 2022. (“the JLSC Application”). Exhibit “JMS1” to the Defendant’s affidavit.
(b)His application to the Search Committee dated the 27th September 2022 (“the SC Application”). Exhibit “JB1” to the Claimant’s affidavit.
(c)His letter to the Search Committee dated the 30th April 2024 (“the Response Letter”). Exhibit “JB5” to the Claimant’s affidavit.
26.Both Sections 5 “Professional Experience” of the JLSC Application and the SC Application (together “the Applications”) are almost identical save as hereinafter stated.
27.The Applications show that Professor Ventose had first been admitted as a Solicitor and Barrister, Attorney at Law in Saint Lucia on 7 November 2007. He had been enrolled as an attorney at law in Barbados in July 2008 and that he had:
(a) been a senior legal adviser in the Attorney General’s Chambers in the Commonwealth of Dominica for the period 20162017 (one year);
(b)served as a Master of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court assigned to Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Territory of the Virgin Islands for the period November and December 2016 (2 months);
(c)been appointed a Judge of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court in 2018 and assigned to St. KittsNevis. He served as High Court Judge in St. KittsNevis until 2020 (2 years);
(d)“…served several stints as an acting Justice of Appeal from May to December 2023” (7 months); (this period should not count as Section 6(2) of the Courts Order only permits a person to act if that person is qualified for appointment to the substantive post).
(e)practised in Barbados as an advocate as
- Senior Legal Consultant Delany Finisterre, Barbados 2010 – 2018 (8 years). The one year in Dominica as above to be deducted as it is within the same period so effectively 7 years.
- Senior Legal Consultant Finisterre Attorneys, Barbados 20212022 (2 years).
- The only place in which Professor Ventose claimed to have practised as an advocate was Barbados.
- He makes no claim to have practised in St. Lucia or elsewhere.
30. In this regard, see paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Affidavit of JodiAnn Masters Singh filed herein on 3 March 2025:
“16. While his application does not indicate any litigation work being done in St. Lucia, it does indicate that he engaged in litigation since his calling in Barbados in 2008. Sir Hugh Rawlins indicated that Mr. Ventose acquired a comprehensive knowledge of rules of evidence and of court practice and procedure due, in part, to “his practice in Barbados and attendance in court there.
17.We understood from his application that since being called to the Barbadian Bar in 2008 he provided litigation support in matters before the courts and did so during the period between his call in that jurisdiction and his appointment as a High Court judge in 2018. After that stint came to an end Mr. Ventose became Dean of the Faculty of Law at UWI up until his appointment as a Justice of Appeal in 2024.”
- Also, see Section 5 of the Applications and Exhibit “JB5” to the affidavit of the Claimant:
Exhibit “JB5”: …Since my admission to practice as an attorney at law in Saint Lucia, except for the period where I served as a High Court Judge, and over the past 16 years I have engaged in the practice of law in Barbados and Dominica…”.
[17] The foregoing material is relied upon by Mr. Bristol to contend that, excluding the period during which Justice Ventose served on the Court of Appeal, his aggregate professional experience amounts to “12 years and 9 months, or more accurately, 12 years and 2 months when the period on the Court of Appeal is excluded.” Mr. Bristol further argues that, even if the period between Justice Ventose’s admission to the Bar in Saint Lucia in 2007 and his admission to the Barbadian Bar in 2008 is included in the calculation, the aggregate period of qualifying experience still falls short of the 15 years required by section 5 of the Courts Order. On Mr. Bristol’s calculation, the total period amounts to only 14 years and 4 months.
[18] Mr. Bristol further invites the Court to exclude an additional period of seven years from the calculation on the basis that Justice Ventose held a practising certificate authorizing him to practise law in Barbados only during the years 2014 and 2018. This information was obtained from the Registrar of the High Court of Barbados by letter dated 19th February 2025. In support of this contention, Mr. Bristol relies on the provisions of the Legal Profession Act, Cap. 370A of the laws of Barbados, which prohibit any person from practising law in Barbados unless he or she is the holder of a valid practising certificate.
(iii) Mr. Bristol on questions of delay and relief
[19] Finally, Mr. Bristol addresses the objection raised by the JLSC that he failed to act with sufficient promptitude in bringing this claim. He invites the Court to reject the allegation of delay on the basis that it was advanced in the JLSC’s affidavit in answer without any supporting evidential foundation and without providing “particulars of any detrimental effect on the administration of justice nor any substantial hardship or substantial prejudice to the rights of any person” as required by CPR 56.4(2). Mr. Bristol’s view is that this omission constitutes a clear breach of CPR 56.8, by which rule, an affidavit in answer must comply with the pleading requirements prescribed by CPR 10 in relation to defences. Mr. Bristol laments that –
“CPR Part 10.5 provides that the defendant must set out all the facts on which he relies to dispute the claim. CPR Part 10.7 prohibits a defendant from relying on any allegation or factual argument which is not set out in the defence but which could have been set out there, unless the Court gives permission. The Court has given no such permission nor has the defendant applied for such permission.”
[20] He further complains that the lack of particulars has hamstrung his ability to discern what case he has to answer on the issue of delay. The case of The National Lotteries Authority v Jerome Deroche29 is presented as support for this view.
[21] Notwithstanding the alleged lack of evidence, Mr. Bristol makes the following points in answer to the delay issue –
(i) any delay was not unreasonable in the circumstances;
(ii) JLSC was well aware of the likely effect of permitting Justice Ventose to continue sitting in light of its knowledge that he may not have met the qualifying criteria;
(iii)JLSC could have de-rostered Justice Ventose whilst considering the observations of the Search Committee;
(iv)the observations of the Search Committee were communicated by Sir Dennis Byron, former Chief Justice of the Court of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court and former President of the Caribbean Court of Justice and ought to have been accorded serious and further consideration by JLSC; and
(v) the claim concerns an issue of great public importance, namely the legality of the composition of our pinnacle Court and the effect of such illegality on the decisions and judgments of the Court of Appeal.
[22] Further, with respect to whether the delay was unreasonable, Mr. Bristol recounts the history of the correspondence between the Search Committee, Justice Ventose, and the JLSC. The details of that exchange are outlined in the ruling dated 12th December 2025. Having regard to that history, Mr. Bristol submits that any delay in the commencement of these proceedings was not unreasonable.
[23] Mr. Bristol also submits that greater prejudice would be caused to the administration of justice if this court permits Justice Ventose to continue sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal despite not meeting the requisite qualifications for appointment to that office. In any event, he argues, the court retains a discretion to entertain an application for judicial review notwithstanding any delay, especially where the proceedings raise issues of significant public importance. Re S31 is presented as support for this posture.
All in all, Mr. Bristol asks that the relief that he seeks be granted.
JLSC’s stance
(i) How does the JLSC interpret section 5(2) (a)(ii)?
[24] The JLSC’s position may be stated simply, but it carries considerable force. The JLSC acknowledges that section 5(2)(a)(ii) requires it to determine whether a candidate for appointment to the Court of Appeal has not only qualified as an advocate but also “has so practised” as an advocate for an aggregate period of at least fifteen years. It further accepts the traditional distinction between advocates and those who are not advocates, as outlined by Mr. Bristol. The point of divergence arises, however, in relation to the proper interpretation of section 5(2)(a)(ii). Unlike Mr. Bristol, the JLSC’s case is that the provision should not be confined to the traditional meaning for which he argues.
[25] The JLSC offers a more expansive interpretation of the word “advocate” and the term “has so practised” as an advocate. In its closing submissions filed on 16th February 2026, the JLSC urges the court to interpret the phrase “… to include substantive involvement in the preparation and presentation of a case for court including settling pleadings, drafting written submissions, preparing witness statements and other comparable litigation work.”
[26] This approach to interpreting section 5(2)(a)(ii), JLSC opines, accords with the “always speaking” approach to statutory interpretation used by modern courts. That approach assumes that when Parliament passes a law, it intends the courts to read it in a way that allows the law to work sensibly as times change. Courts therefore often apply what is called an “updating construction”, meaning that the words of a statute should be applied in light of current conditions, not only the conditions that existed when the law was first written.” McCartan Turkington Breen (A Firm) v Times Newspapers and Bennion on Statutory Interpretation are presented as authorities for this view.
[27] The JLSC reasons that adopting this approach to interpretation would result in a broader understanding of the terms “advocate” and “advocacy”, one that is not limited to the conduct of oral advocacy before courts or tribunals. The JLSC observes, by way of example, that contemporary legal practice does not invariably require advocates to present oral submissions before a court. Advocacy may equally be undertaken through the preparation and presentation of written submissions, a process commonly referred to as “written advocacy” –
“26. …Evidence is no longer given through lengthy oral examinations-in-chief, where counsel had to take care not to lead a witness into an answer. Instead, the witness’s evidence is set out in a written witness statement that is prepared and filed well before the witness even enters the witness box.
27.In the same way, attorneys-at-law often file written submissions in advance of hearings, and in many matters (especially interlocutory applications) the court may decide the issues on paper without the need for oral argument. Even trials, or parts of trials, may sometimes be dealt with in this way…”
[28] JLSC relies on Norfolk County Council v Webster and others37 to support the foregoing arguments and as underpinning the proposition that “…‘practise as an advocate’ should be given an updating construction and be interpreted to mean ‘practise in litigation.’”
[29] JLSC’s case is that the “updating construction” is the proper way in which to interpret section 5. JLSC maintains that an interpretation of section 5(2)(a)(ii) along the lines proposed by Mr. Bristol would frustrate the legislative purpose underlying section 5, which is to ensure that only candidates who have attained a minimum threshold of competence may be appointed as Justices of Appeal. JLSC continues –
“30. If it were to be accepted, an attorney who has spent over fifteen years doing essential litigation work (e.g. preparing pleadings, written submissions, witness statements and other documents needed to present a case) would be treated as lacking competence merely because he has not personally made oral submissions in the traditional manner of a barrister.
31.That approach places undue weight on oral advocacy, which is only one small part of modern litigation. It ignores the written and preparatory work that has become central to how cases are actually presented.”
(ii) JLSC on whether Justice Ventose “has so practised”
[30] The JLSC next addresses the question of whether Justice Ventose practised as an advocate for the aggregate period of fifteen years required by section 5(2)(a)(ii). It submits that he did so practise and therefore met the constitutional qualification. JLSC makes the following points in support –
(1) Since his call to the Bar in Saint Lucia in 2007, Justice Ventose “assisted with legal opinions and drafting documents for selected matters which have engaged the courts.” JLSC refers to the reference provided by former Chief Justice Sir Hugh Rawlins as corroborating the assertion;
(2) Justice Ventose’s letter to the Search Committee dated 30th April 2024 stated that he had appeared in court as an advocate and had “assisted persons involved in proceedings for the resolution of issues arising under law”.
[31] JLSC submits that the foregoing material demonstrates that “…between 2007, when he was called to the Bar in St Lucia, and 2024, when he was appointed as a Justice of Appeal, he was engaged in practice as an advocate (using its wider definition) except for those periods during which he was sitting in a judicial capacity.”
[32] JLSC further argues that Mr. Bristol has failed to prove that Justice Ventose did not practise as an advocate throughout the 16 year period from the time of his call to the Bar in 2007 to his elevation to the Court of Appeal in January 2024.
TO BE CONTINUED