“…It is declared and ordered as follows:- (1) The punishment of flogging authorised by sections 70, 75, 78, 79, 95, 212 and 276 of the Criminal Code and section 16 of the Praedial Larceny Act are unconstitutional as they contravene section 13 of the Constitution’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex.”
This is the ruling handed down just over a week ago by Raulston Glasgow which could have the effect of bringing an end to flogging in Grenada.
The case was argued before the judge by attorneys Ruggles Ferguson, KC and U.S-trained barrister-at-law Jerry Edwin.
Ferguson appeared for one of the Claimants Edward Joseph and Edwin was retained by Shabba Ferguson and Jason Alexis.
The lawyers representing the State were Adebayo Oluwu and Alleyna Cheeseman.
The Claimants were challenging the constitutionality of Section 16 of the Praedial Larceny act which gave a Magistrate the power to order flogging.
Most of the recent floggings were ordered by former Magistrate Jerry Seales.
The case before Justice Glasgow was styled, “THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 16 OF THE PREDIAL LARCENY CAP. 250 OF THE 2010 EDITION OF THE CONTINUOUS REVISED LAWS OF GRENADA AND IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 5 AND 15 OF THE CONSTITUTION AND IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR CONSTITUTIONAL REDRESS PURSUANT TO SECTION 16 OF THE CONSTITUTION.”
Following is the full ruling as delivered by the high court judge:-
110] The modifications to the Criminal Code to remove the provisions in violation of the antidiscrimination clause in the Constitution are therefore as follows –
(1) Section 70 is modified to remove subsections 70(3) and (4) which refer to flogging and whipping;
(2) Section 75 is deleted entirely as it refers solely to rules on which flogging and whipping are to be inflicted;
(3) Section 78(1) and (2) refer to alternative sentences in cases where flogging and whipping are ordered and as such are removed from that section;
(4) Section 79(1)(b) is modified to remove the words “…and any flogging…” and the words “…flogging or whipping …” at section 79(2);
(5) The words “ …and whether with or without flogging or whipping in respect of any offences for which flogging and whipping may be lawfully inflicted” recited at section 95(2) and (3) are excised;
(6) The words “ …and, in the discretion of the Court, to flogging” are excised from section 212; and
(7) The words “…and, in the discretion of the Court, to flogging” are excised from section 276(2).
Praedial Larceny Act
[111] It is already noted that flogging for the offence of predial larceny was enacted in the Praedial Larceny Act 1992. As such this Act does not qualify as an existing law since its enactment post-dated the Constitution. This also means that the Act cannot be considered for modification under the modification clause in the Constitution. The Constitution’s supreme law clause in section 106 is engaged, and the Act must be scrutinized to determine to the extent to which its provisions violate the terms of the Constitution. Those provisions which are found in violation of the Constitution are void to the extent of their inconsistency with it. The case of Attorney General for Alberta v Attorney General for Canada suggests the manner in which constitutional provisions of the nature of section 106 are to interpreted and applied –
“The real question is whether what remains is so inextricably bound up with the part declared invalid that what remains cannot independently survive or as it has sometimes been put whether on a fair review of the whole matter it can be assumed that the legislature would have enacted what survives without enacting the part that is ultra vires at all”.
[112] I would say that if one removes section 16(2) of the Praedial Larceny Act which enacts the discriminatory law, what would be left cannot independently survive for the very reasons to which I have stated with respect to the provisions of section 75(2) of the Criminal Code. To remove section 16(2) would be tantamount to leaving a law in place that exposes women to flogging. Such a result would, in my view, amount to an impermissible judicial reach further than it is obvious that the legislature would have gone. It would also expose women to a description of punishment, that is to say a form of torture, inhuman and degrading punishment that did not predate the Constitution and would thus render the statute susceptible to challenges on the grounds that it contravenes section 5(1) of the Constitution. It would appear that, as with section 75(2) of the Criminal Code, the impugned provision cannot be cured without excising the punishment of flogging from section 16 of the Praedial Larceny Act. Removing flogging from the section leaves nothing standing that will comport with the Constitution and as such the section is wholly struck down.
Whether the mandatory sentences provided for under section 16 of the Praedial Larceny Act contravene section 5(1) of the Constitution
[113] Having found that section 16 of the Praedial Larceny Act is inconsistent with the Constitution and is wholly void, this issue seems moot. I will shortly address it in the event that I am wrong on my assessment with regard to section 16 in the previous section of this judgment. In this context, the claimants complain that the mandatory infliction of flogging pursuant to the proviso to section 16 of the Praedial Larceny Act violates their rights under section 5(1) of the Constitution.
[114] Section 16 of the Praedial Larceny Act has been recited above but I will repeat it here for the present discussion –
16. Flogging
(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Criminal Code, Chapter 72A, or any other law prohibiting or regulating the passing of a sentence of corporal punishment by flogging or whipping, it shall be lawful for a Magistrate on a second or subsequent conviction for an offence committed under section 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 or 8, in addition to any other punishment imposed under this Act, to sentence the offender where an adult to be flogged or where a young person to be whipped; but save as hereinbefore provided the provisions of the Criminal Code regulating the execution of such a sentence shall govern any such sentence made by the Magistrate under this section: Provided that in the case of an offence under section 8(2) or (3), a Magistrate shall order flogging in respect of any such offence, even if it be the first such offence of the particular offender once such offender has attained the age of eighteen years.
(2) The provisions of this section shall not apply to any female person convicted of any offence under this Act. (Bold emphasis mine).
[115] The claimants’ main argument is that to the extent that the proviso to section 16(1) of the Praedial Larceny Act mandates the manner in which the section of flogging should be applied, it conflicts with section 5(1) of the Constitution since that section only protects laws that authorize “the infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful in Grenada immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution.” As the defendant rightly concedes, the mandatory imposition of flogging enacted at the proviso to section 16(1) of the Praedial Larceny Act does not merely stipulate a description of punishment but mandates the manner or circumstances in which it ought to be deployed.
[116] This was precisely the circumstances in Reyes where the Privy Council found that while the death penalty as a description of punishment predated the Belize Constitution, the law requiring (or mandating) that the death penalty be imposed, violated the provisions of the constitution prohibiting inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment. I can do no more than apply the dicta to these circumstances and find that the proviso so violates section 5(1) of the Constitution in so far as the sentencing court is mandated to impose flogging as a sanction in the circumstances therein delineated. The proviso is an unconstitutional reach into judicial discretion in matters of the appropriate sentence to be pronounced by a court and is a breach of the separation of powers implicit in the construct of the Constitution. See Reyes, Spence and Hughes and Deaton v The Attorney General and the Revenue Commissioners in this regard.
[117] The Constitution is the supreme law of Grenada and subject to the provisions of the Constitution, if any law is inconsistent with the Constitution, the Constitution shall prevail and the other law, shall, to the extent of the inconsistency be void. I have recited above the guidance from the case of Attorney General for Alberta v Attorney General for Canada on applying section 106 of the constitution.
[118] Applying the principle in Attorney General for Alberta v Attorney General for Canada to the proviso, it would appear that the rest of section 16 (1) can stand without the offending proviso. The proviso to section 16(1) which reads –
“Provided that in the case of an offence under section 8(2) or (3), a Magistrate shall order flogging in respect of any such offence, even if it be the first such offence of the particular offender once such offender has attained the age of eighteen years” is struck down as being null and of no effect since it violates the Constitution for the reasons that I have stated above.
Whether the imposition of flogging immediately after sentencing (1) infringed the claimants’ rights to protection of the law (section 8 of the Constitution); and (2) constituted cruel and inhuman punishment in violation of sections 5(1) of the Constitution
[119] On this issue, the claimants contend that in Mr. Ferguson’s case, flogging him forthwith after sentencing rendered nugatory his right to appeal within 14 days under sections 3 and 4 of the Magistrates Judgments (Appeals Act)98. In the case of Mr. Joseph, counsel argues that the arbitrariness of his flogging immediately after sentencing was compounded by the existence of section 40 and 50 of the West Indies Associated States Act. Accordingly, Mr. Ferguson’s and Mr. Joseph’s rights to protection of the law as guaranteed by section 8 of the Constitution were breached. Counsel for the defendant’s response is that in both claims, the issue of the execution of flogging in contravention of the right to the protection of law was not alleged or raised in the present claim as no declarations were sought on the claimants’ pleaded cases, and that there is no evidence that an appeal was lodged or is going to be lodged.
[120] Sections 3 and 4 of the Magistrates Judgments (Appeals) Act read –
3. Right of appeal
Unless the contrary is in any case expressly provided by any Act any party may appeal from the judgement of a Magistrate to the Court in the manner and subject to the conditions hereinafter mentioned: Provided that there shall be no appeal— (a) in civil cases where the sum claimed is less than twenty-four dollars, save by leave of the Court granted on an ex parte application; (b) in criminal cases from any judgement dismissing the complaint, save by leave of the Director of Public Prosecutions.
4. Notice of appeal
(1) A party who desires to appeal shall— (a) at the time of the pronouncing of the judgement, give verbal notice to the Magistrate and the opposite party of his or her intention to appeal; or (b) within fourteen days after the pronouncing of the judgement, serve notice in writing in the Form A in the First Schedule hereto of his or her appeal upon the Magistrate and upon the opposite party. (2) Where the appellant is in prison, the Commissioner of Prisons shall, on being requested by the appellant to do so, render to the appellant all reasonable assistance in the preparation of the notice of appeal and shall cause it to be lodged and a copy thereof to be served as required above without payment of any fees or expenses.
[121] Section 40 of the West Indies Associated States Act provides for a right of appeal in indictable matters –
“40. Right of appeal in criminal cases
A person convicted on indictment may appeal under this Act to the Court of Appeal— (a) against his or her conviction on any ground of appeal which involves a question of law alone; (b) with the leave of the Court of Appeal or upon the certificate of the Judge who tried him or her that it is a fit case for appeal against his or her conviction on any ground of appeal which involves a question of fact alone, or a question of mixed law and fact, or any other ground which appears to the Court of Appeal to be a sufficient ground of appeal; and
(c) with the leave of the Court of Appeal against the sentence passed on his or her conviction, unless the sentence is one fixed by law.”
And section 50 reads:
“In the case of a conviction involving the sentence of death or corporal punishment –
(a) The sentence shall not in any case be executed until the expiration of the time within which notice of appeal or of an application for leave to appeal may be given under the preceding section; and
(b) If notice is so given, the appeal or application for leave to appeal as the case may be shall be heard and determined with as much expedition as practicable, and the sentence shall not be executed until after the determination of the appeal, or, in cases where an application for leave to appeal is refused, of the application.”
The section 8 complaint
[122] Section 8 of the Constitution is described in the Constitution as the “provisions to secure the protection of the law”. Shortly, the claimants insists that any wrongful denial of the citizen’s access to justice is a breach of the right to the protection of the law. I agree. I would also add that any interferencewhether expressly or implicitly with the citizen’s access to justice would be the proper approach to interrogating whether the protection of the law has been affected negatively. It is in this context that I cannot accept the defendant’s posture that this issue should be disposed of in the defendant’s favour because the claimants did not insist on their right of appeal.
[123] It is quite self-evident that by enacting sections 3 and 4 of the Magistrates Judgments (Appeals) Act and sections 40 and 50 of the West Indies Associated States (Grenada) Act the legislature is making an avenue available to the claimants to review any sentence pronounced whether in the magistrate’s court (in Mr. Ferguson’s case) or in the High Court (in Mr. Joseph’s case). One has bear in mind in this case that, unlike many other forms of punishment, one is not only dealing with a graphic and dehumanising form of punishment but also the fact that there is no recourse to redressing or meaningfully ameliorating its effect once it is inflicted. More bluntly, once a convicted person is flogged, he cannot be “unflogged”.
[124] I find therefore that in the context of the kind of punishment engaged in cases of this sort, the right to appeal is part and parcel of the access to justice and procedural fairness afforded to the claimants and contemplated by section 8 of the constitution. This is since, to have flogged the claimants before the period to lodge an appeal in both cases had expired, would have shut the door on any possibility of them exploring the right secured to him by the law, a right that presented them with the possibility of reversing the imposition of this cruel form of punishment. The claimants rely heavily on dictum from Lord Hamblen in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Charles, pronouncements which I find wholly apposite to the issue at hand and will adopt –
“In Maharaj Lord Kerr…giving the judgment of the Board, noted at para 25 that: “In a series of cases where the protection of the law provision in various Caribbean countries was considered, an expansive approach to its potential application has been taken.” In this connection, he cited the judgments of the Caribbean Court of Justice in Attorney General of Barbados v Joseph and Boyce (2006) 69 WIR 104 at para 60, which describes the right as being “broad and pervasive”… He set out the often-cited passage at para 47 of the Maya Leaders Alliance case…It provides as follows: “The law is evidently in a state of evolution but we make the following observations. The right to protection of the law is a multi-dimensional, broad and pervasive constitutional precept grounded in fundamental notions of justice and the rule of law. The right toprotection of the law prohibits acts by the Government which arbitrarily or unfairly deprive individuals of their basic constitutional rights to life, liberty or property. It encompasses the right of every citizen of access to the courts and other judicial bodies established by law to prosecute and demand effective relief to remedy any breaches of constitutional rights. However, the concept goes beyond such questions of access and includes the right of the citizen to be afforded ‘adequate safeguards against irrationality, unreasonableness, fundamental unfairness or arbitrary exercise of power.’ The right to protection of the law may, in appropriate cases, require the relevant organs of the State to take positive action in order to secure and ensure the enjoyment of basic constitutional rights. In appropriate cases, the action or failure of the state may result in a breach of the right to protection of the law. Where the citizen has been denied rights of access and the procedural fairness demanded by natural justice, or where the citizen’s rights have otherwise been frustrated because of government action or omission,
there may be ample grounds for finding a breach of the protection of the law for which damages may be an appropriate remedy.”
[125] As I have stated above, I do not see the relevance of the argument raised by counsel for the defendant. While there was no evidence that an appeal
was going to be lodged, it is evident for instance in Mr. Ferguson’s case, that he was unrepresented at trial. Given the right of appeal secured to him by law, and compounded with the fact that he was self-represented it seems to me even more important that he ought to have been notified of his right to appeal the sentence, and/or that the period during which he could have exercised such a right should have expired before such a dehumanising and degrading punishment was inflicted on him. Equally, Mr Joseph was unrepresented at his sentencing. Given his right to appeal as well compounded with the fact that he was unrepresented at sentencing, he ought to have been allowed the period of appeal to consider his rights of appeal. This is what the full protection of the law envisaged by section 8 contemplates. To do otherwise was in flagrant disregard of the claimants’ right to the full protection of the law. As such breach of the section 8 protection of the law has been made out by the claimants.
The section 5 issue
[126] Mr. Ferguson sought a declaration that the manner and circumstances of his immediate flogging constituted cruel and inhuman punishment. This appears to be a complaint that his section 5(1) rights have been breached. Again, this court reminds itself that section 5(2) of the Constitution only saves flogging as a description of punishment. Section 5(2) does not save or stipulate the manner or circumstances in which the punishment is imposed. The manner and circumstances in which it is inflicted must comply with the law and must in that regard ensure that the rights of the citizen are respected. The case law101 recited above on this question instruct that the constitutionality of the manner of imposing a saved description of punishment is certainly open for discussion.
[127] In this context the State was obligated to ensure that it executed the sentence of flogging in a manner that, among other things, allowed the claimants the opportunity to explore the full range of appeal rights available to them. More specifically, flogging in a manner that firmly shuts the door on any possibility of a convicted person seeking to have the sentence of flogging reversed before it is executed would not be embargoed by section 5(2) from scrutiny for possible breach of the section 5(1) right not to be exposed to an inhuman and degrading description of punishment. In that regard, flogging Mr. Fergusson and Mr. Joseph without allowing them to explore any appeal (or put more bluntly, before the expiration of the period in which they may have contemplated the right of appeal secured to them by law) was not only a violation of their right to protection of law secured to them by section 8 of the Constitution but was also a violation of section 5(1) of the Constitution in that they were exposed to an inhuman and degrading description of punishment in a manner not contemplated by the law.
Whether the claimants are entitled to any of the relief sought
[128] I have found that Mr. Joseph’s and Mr. Ferguson’s right not to be exposed to discriminatory treatment without reasonable justification has been breached. For Mr. Alexis, his right not to be exposed to discriminatory treatment without reasonable justification is likely to be breached since he is in jeopardy of being flogged if convicted of the offence of praedial larceny. Additionally, flogging Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Joseph immediately after sentencing was a breach of their section 5(1) and section 8 rights not to be exposed to an inhuman and degrading description of punishment and their right to protection of the law respectively.
[129] Additionally, Mr. Ferguson pleads that he was sentenced to flogging after being convicted pursuant to section 8(1) of the Praedial Larceny Act, and that judicial officers wrongfully exercise their discretion to flog persons convicted of praedial larceny, irrespective of whether the infraction was pursuant to section 8(1), 8(2) or 8(3) of the Praedial Larceny Act. I disagree with Mr. Ferguson’s claim on this point. Even though he was charged under section 8(1), the evidence from the defendant shows that he had several previous convictions for praedial larceny. Pursuant to section 16(1) of the Praedial Larceny Act, the magistrate could exercise his or her discretion to order flogging on a second or subsequent conviction for praedial larceny. Accordingly, this claim for relief fails.
The Appropriate Relief
[130] Section 16 of the Constitution gives the court power to grant redress where a fundamental right has been, is being or is likely to be breached, and it is on this basis that the claimants make some of their request for relief. In that regard, Mr. Ferguson and Joseph have claimed vindicatory damages for breach of their constitutional rights on the authority of Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v Ramanoop and exemplary damages for the arbitrary way in which they were flogged in violation of their rights. No authorities on the appropriate quantum was submitted to the court. With respect to relief on the question of the constitutionality of the legislation, the claimants have been granted declarations and orders to reflect the findings on those questions.
[131] The defendant agrees that the court is empowered to award damages if breaches of the claimants’ constitutional rights are found as held in Ramanoop, but submit that any award of damages ought to be nominal, signifying an acknowledgement of the significance and sanctity of the right without creating a precedent for abusive or unreasonable exploitation as set out in Russell & Ors v Attorney General. Counsel also provides the cases of Bibi Sheneeza Ali v Commissioner of Police et ors to make the point that where breaches of constitutional rights are not grave, nominal damages is the appropriate award. The defendant also submits that the circumstances of this case do not justify an award of exemplary damages, but provided no authorities on the appropriate quantum in the circumstances.
Vindicatory Damages
[132] On the issue of vindicatory damages Michel JA (as he then was) in The Attorney General of Saint Christoper and Nevis v Carmel Bernadette Agnes McGill stated that –
“An award of vindicatory damages is intended to mark the wrong of the affected party rather than to compensate him for the consequences of the wrong. Such an award would usually be made in public law cases where there is a breach of the claimant’s constitutional right.”
Further in Innis v Attorney General of Saint Christopher and Nevis, Lord Hope of Craighead described the object of the award:
“The purpose of the award, whether it is made to redress the contravention or as relief is to vindicate the right. It is not to punish the Executive…but vindication involves an assertion that the right is a valuable one, as to whose enforcement the complainant…has an interest.”
Lord Nicholls in Ramanoop outlined the principle:
“When exercising this constitutional jurisdiction, the court is concerned to uphold or vindicate the constitutional right which has been contravened. A declaration by the court will articulate the fact of the violation, but in most cases, more will be required than words… An award of compensation will go some distance towards vindicating the infringed constitutional right. How far it goes will depend on the circumstances, but in principle it may well not suffice… An additional award not necessarily of substantial size may be needed to reflect the sense of public outrage, emphasize the importance of the constitutional right and the gravity of the breach and deter further breaches. All these elements have a place in this additional award…Although such an award, where called for, is likely in most cases to cover much the same ground in financial terms as would award by way of punishment in the strict sense of retribution, punishment in the latter sense is not its object…”
[133] In Peters v Marksman and another110, Adams J was tasked with assessing damages after Mr. Peters had obtained several declarations in 1997 from Mitchell J that his sentence of whipping by 10 strokes with a cat of nine tails by the Superintendent of Prisons, solitary confinement and shackling in iron clad leggings and handcuffs was unconstitutional for infringing the applicant’s right under the Saint Vincent & Grenadines Constitution not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading punishment. Adams J in finding that liability was not based on vicarious liability by virtue of a tort committed by state agents, but rather primarily liability in the area of public law for a wrong committed by the state in its name, also took into account the learning in AG of St Christopher and Nevis v Reynolds that the court ought to consider as relevant to computation of damages recompense for the inconvenience and distress suffered by the victim of the breach.
[134] Adams J also considered Fuller v AG of Jamaica where Patterson JA reasoned that where an award of monetary compensation is appropriate in constitutional claims, the crucial question on quantum must be what a reasonable amount is in the circumstances, taking into account that the infringement should not be blown out of proportion or trivialised. In arriving at a sum of $50,000 for the flogging, and an additional $100,000 for the shackling and solitary confinement, Adams J considered Mr. Peter’s pain and suffering, the assault on his dignity, the distress and inconvenience which followed and the disgrace and humiliation which accompanied the treatment given to Mr. Peters.
[135] Considering the factors outlined in the case, I would award Mr. Joseph and Mr. Ferguson the sum of $ 15,000 each as vindication for the breach of their right under section 5(1) and 8 of the Constitution. In the circumstances of the case, the declarations with respect to section 13 suffice to vindicate the breach of that right.
Exemplary Damages
[136] Where the claim for exemplary damages is concerned, I am not satisfied on the evidence that the tests as set out in Rookes v Bernard113 have been satisfied, as I have not found any conduct that is oppressive, calculated to make a profit or that statute provides for such an award. While the claimants have complained that the servants of the government acted arbitrarily and unconstitutionally, the state functionaries were executing lawful sentences of the court at the material time. Misguided as they may have been, there is no evidence that they performed their duties in any oppressive or highhanded manner. I therefore decline to award exemplary damages in this case.
Costs
[137] Neither party made submissions on costs. Given that the claimants have been partially successful, they are entitled to their costs. I award costs to each of the claimants in the sum of $5,000.
CONCLUSION
[138] For the reasons set out above, it is declared and ordered as follows:
1) The punishment of flogging authorized by sections 70, 75, 78, 79, 95, 212 and 276 of the Criminal Code and section 16 of the Praedial Larceny Act are unconstitutional as they contravene section 13 of the Constitution’s prohibition against discrimination on the basis of sex;
2) Section 16 of the Praedial Larceny Act is struck down in its entirety;
3) The modifications to sections 70, 75, 78, 79, 95, 212 and 276 (2) of the Criminal Code to bring the Criminal Code into conformity with the Constitution of Grenada are as follows –
a. Section 70 is modified to remove the references to flogging and whipping at section 70(3) and (4);
b. Section 75 is deleted entirely as it refers solely to rules on which flogging and whipping are to be inflicted;
c. Sections 78(1) and (2) refer to alternative sentences in cases where flogging and whipping are ordered and as such are removed from that section;
d. Section 79(1)(b) is modified to remove the words “…and any flogging…” and the words “…flogging or whipping …” at section 79(2)’;
6. The words “ …and whether with or without flogging or whipping in respect of any offences for which flogging and whipping may be lawfully inflicted” recited at section 95(2) and (3) are excised;
f. The words “ …and, in the discretion of the Court, to flogging” are excised from section 212; and
g. The words “…and, in the discretion of the Court, to flogging” are excised from section 276(2).
4) The claimants are granted a declaration that the proviso to section 16(1) of the Praedial Larceny Act which reads –
“Provided that in the case of an offence under section 8(2) or (3), a Magistrate shall order flogging in respect of any such offence, even if it be the first such offence of the particular offender once such offender has attained the age of eighteen years” which provides for mandatory flogging is unconstitutional and declared null and void for breach of section 5(1) and violation of the separation of powers doctrine of the Constitution of Grenada;
5) Mr. Ferguson and Mr. Joseph’s rights not to be exposed to discriminatory treatment without reasonable justification under section 13 of the Constitution of Grenada have been breached;
6) Mr. Alexis’ right not to be exposed to discriminatory treatment without reasonable justification under section 13 of the Constitution of Grenada is likely to be breached;
7) The forthwith execution of the sentence of flogging imposed on Mr. Ferguson on 10th July 2017 breached his rights under sections 5(1) and 8 of the Constitution of Grenada and Mr. Ferguson is awarded vindicatory damages in the sum of $15,000;
8. The forthwith execution of the sentence of flogging imposed on Mr. Joseph on 24th November 2017 breached his rights under sections 5(1) and 8 of the Constitution of Grenada and Mr. Joseph is awarded vindicatory damages in the sum of $15,000’
9. No award is made for exemplary damages and all other declarations sought by the claimants are refused; and
- Each claimant is awarded coast in the sum of $5,000.
[139] I wish to record my sincere thanks to counsel for the respective parties for their thoughtful and elucidating oral and written submissions filed in support of their respective positions, and for their immense patience in awaiting the ruling in this claim.
Raulston L.A. Glasgow
High Court Judge
By the Court
Registrar