“I am not persuaded that the judge erred in principle is assessing the award of general damages, nor can it be said with any measure of reasonable justification that $100,000.00 was out of all reasonable proportion in relation to the injury to respondent’s reputation and feelings.”
Those were the words used by Justice of Appeal of the Eastern Caribbean Supreme Court Trevor Ward as he dismissed the challenge made to the decision of high court judge Raulston Glasgow against former Grenada Prime Minister Keith Mitchell in an $EC130, 000.00 ruling against him in a Defamation lawsuit filed against him by former Sports Minister Patrick Simmons.
The Court of Appeal reportedly dismissed all the grounds of appeal in the lawsuit that was filed on behalf of the island’s longest serving Prime Minister by former Trinidad and Tobago Attorney General Lawrence Ramesh Maharaj.
The two other Justices of Appeal who heard the matter – Mde. Vicki Ann Ellis and Mde. Esco L. Henry concurred with the ruling of Justice Ward.
The case stemmed from erroneous statements made by Keith Mitchell in his capacity as Prime Minister against Simmonds, the former Member of Parliament for St Andrew South-east in the sale of government lands in Hope that was intended for use by the University of the West Indies.
The former Political Leader of the New National Party (NNP) had wrongfully told Grenadians at a public meeting in New York that Simmons was involved in the sale of the land in order to become a beneficiary from the proceeds as a member of the Cabinet.
During the hearing before the 3-member panel of Court of Appeal Justice, Mitchell was represented by Maharaj SC along with local attorney-at-law Nigel Stewart while attorneys Alban John and Hazel Hopkin-La Touche appeared for Simmons.
The top Trinidad lawyer signaled to the Court of Appeal that his client intends to take the matter to the London-based Privy Council, which is the final court of appeal for the Grenada jurisdiction.
As a public service, THE NEW TODAY reproduces in full the ruling by the Court of Appeal Justices in favour of Simmons against the ex-Grenadian leader:-
[38] And at paragraph 27:
“The court must not put a strained or unlikely construction upon the words and overanalyses of the words and their context is to be avoided. If they are capable of bearing a number of good interpretations, it is unreasonable to seize upon the only bad one to give the words a defamatory sense.”
[39] No less injurious or more understanding or generous meaning was pleaded by the appellant in his defence. He simply pleaded that he “denies that the words set out in paragraphs 3 and 4 of the statement of claim bore, or were understood to bear, or were capable of bearing any of the meanings alleged or any defamatory meaning.”
[40] Indeed, no less injurious or more understanding or generous meaning readily occurs to me, and the judge found none. At this stage, it is not for this Court to simply prefer a different meaning within a reasonably available range. In such an instance, the authorities make it clear that an appellate court should not interfere with the judge’s findings on meaning.
[41] Learned Senior Counsel for the appellant, Mr. Ramesh Lawrence-Maharaj in submitting that the judge did not consider the context in which the impugned statements were made in determining their meaning also sought to draw a parallel between the context in which the words were uttered in this case and the context in which the words were uttered in Ramadhar v Ramadhar. In that case, the appellant was the political leader of the Congress of the People (COP) political party in Trinidad and Tobago, which was part of a coalition government. Disagreement emerged within the party about his leadership decisions. His brother, the respondent, was one of the disaffected members. He proposed resolutions to withdraw from the coalition and criticized the appellant’s leadership. A National Council meeting was scheduled for 10th November 2013 to discuss these resolutions, but they were not pursued. A letter dated 1st October 2013, purportedly signed by the respondents, was sent to the opposition People’s National Movement party (PNM). It claimed that three COP candidates were not party members and included a CD with the COP’s membership list. The letter was read at the National Council meeting, leading to a resolution to suspend the respondents pending an investigation into their conduct. Following the meeting, Prakash Ramadhar and other COP leaders held a televised press conference. Prakash stated that he made no pronouncement on the authenticity of the October letter but condemned the alleged betrayal if true, emphasizing the need for an investigation. The material parts of his statements as reproduced from the judgment are:
“[1] Contrary to the many efforts by a few to destroy the party, the party stood in its resolve [that the party is greater than any individual or group of individuals. This party is the only hope in the politics of Trinidad and Tobago and I say that unreservedly.]
[2] Those who moved motions of no confidence against the leader of this party knew full well, that they grounded their ambitions in an effort to destroy this party by attacking the leader. They made it clear in other statements that their intent was to destroy this party and that their efforts had nothing to do with the lack of confidence in the leader, but everything to do with their wanting to destroy the leader and therefore the party. The party today resoundingly rejected them and they know full well they could not have succeeded [and] did not pursue their trouble making efforts in the face of the National Council.
[3] They would do so in the media, in solitary effort where they had open space to spread their poison but here where it mattered, where their voices would have been heard so the party would say whether we agree or reject you, they ran away like cowards.
[4] And then to have found that the very personalities who have been making all the mischief on the outside, that this letter has come to us and I make no pronouncements as to its authenticity, it maybe all the media they have garnered for the last several weeks or months, maybe they should go to the media and explain whether they did in fact put their signature to such a letter, betraying the party by disclosing its membership list, something we hold very dear.
[5] And let me explain why [a membership list] is important, when people join a political organisation they are much afraid by that they may be discriminated against by the mere fact that they hold membership in a party. Many may not feel that way, but many do feel that way, [and that is] why we held it in terms of a high level of confidentiality. If it is true that they did do these things, then that is the highest level of treachery that we condemn in politics generally and in the COP unreservedly.
[6] And that is why the suspension, without a finding of guilt, and that is why we ask that a proper and full investigation into the matter and if it proved true, the next step is expulsion from the party […]” (paragraph numbers added)
[7] The party has been condemned for not being decisive, but that is to confuse process with doing what is right and what is proper, and in these circumstances where the allegations were so strong and so high, we say step aside and let the investigation be concluded, and then whatever necessary steps be taken after that, the party will engage.”
[42] The respondents sued for defamation, claiming Prakash’s statements at the press conference falsely accused them of disloyalty and treachery. The High Court and the Court of Appeal (majority) found Prakash liable for defamation, ruling his statements implied guilt despite his qualifications. The Privy Council disagreed, holding that Prakash’s statements, read in context, only suggested grounds for investigation and were justified. The appeal was allowed, overturning the lower courts’ decisions.
[43] The Board identified a number of errors made by the judge: (i) he failed to set out the terms of the qualifications actually made by the appellant; (ii) he did not give full and fair account of the reservations that had been made; and (iii) he appears not to have considered the full context in which the statements were made, in ascertaining meaning and context was an important consideration.
[44] The context was that the impugned statements were made orally at a press conference that was being broadcast live. In those circumstances, the Board held that at paragraph 38:
“Some margin has to be allowed for the fact that the statements were made orally and so were more likely to be made in a conversational style and without the precision of a legal document. The other particularly important element of the context in this case, however, is that the press conference took place in real time and was broadcast live. Some margin has to be allowed for the fact that the statements were made orally and so were more likely to be made in a conversational style and without the precision of a legal document. What a person says in those circumstances should be interpreted with a certain degree of understanding and generosity.”
[45] Nonetheless, it was made clear that the principle that in determining meaning due allowance must be made for understanding and generosity in the context of statements made impromptu in real time is no licence for politicians to be unheeding of the need for accuracy in their utterances. As the Board stated at paragraph 36:
“The Board does not suggest that a press conference given by senior politicians is to be regarded as an occasion for casual statements. On the contrary, there is a clear public interest that politicians talking in public should observe high standards of accuracy and fairness since the public need to know the true position and are inevitably influenced by what they say. Moreover, in the eyes of the law, the respondents were entitled to have their reputations protected from untrue allegations.”
[46] In my view, while the principle is clear that context is relevant to construction of meaning, the factual situation in Ramadhar is sufficiently distinguishable. The similarity is that in the instant case, as in Ramadhar, the impugned statements were made orally in a public forum and concerned a matter of public interest involving political figures. The similarities end there. There was no evidence that the Town Hall meeting was being broadcast live, unlike the situation in Ramadhar. More importantly, the appellant’s statements in Ramadhar stopped well short of asserting that the respondents were responsible for leaking the list of members of the party and the appellant was clear in his statement that that matter required investigation. The position is explained at paragraphs 44 and 48 of the Board’s judgment:
“44. Paras 4, 5 and 6 of Mr. Prakash Ramadhar’s press conference statements are, moreover, couched as conditional statements, conditional, that is, on the respondents being shown to have committed the wrongful acts of writing the letter to the PNM and disclosing the membership list. Thus, in para 4 he expressly declares that he was not making any pronouncements on the authenticity of the letter, and in para 5, he says that it was treachery to the party to hand over the membership list to PNM, but this was only “if it is true that they did do these things”. In para 6, he states that, if the allegations were proved, then it would be appropriate to seek the respondents’ expulsion. So, in the judgment of the Board, he was not jumping to conclusions on the question whether they wrote the October letter or passed the COP membership list to the PNM.”…
48 Examining the various statements made at the press conference, the Board considers that it is clear that the appellant qualified what he said about the respondents by stating that the authenticity of the letter was in question and that there had to be an investigation to determine what had happened. He made no secret of the fact that he considered that handing over the memberships lists to the PNM would be an act of treachery and that serious consequences would have to follow but this was only by reference to the situation which would arise if in an investigation it were established that the respondents had written the October letter. The bane and the antidote have to be taken together. Since the attacks on him were effectively undermining his leadership, he was entitled to meet them in a robust fashion.”
[47] By contrast, in the instant case, there was nothing tentative or qualified about the appellant’s statements. He asserted as fact that members of the company who were Ministers of Government, including, the appellant, knew that the government wished to acquire the land, and with that knowledge purchased it and sold it to the government for profit. While his answer was an impromptu one, the appellant insisted that he was speaking with authority on facts which were verifiable by reference to Cabinet papers to which he was privy. To my mind this was no half-considered response or repartee in the moment; the appellant was adamant, even when challenged, that he was speaking from information derived from Cabinet papers such that every assertion he made was factual.
[48] While it may be said with justification that the judge did not expressly state that in determining the meaning to be ascribed to the impugned words he took into consideration the context in which they were made, even when due allowance is made for the fact the statements were uttered as an impromptu response to a question posed at a Town Hall meeting, there is in my view no more understanding or generous or less injurious way in which to interpret the words than as interpreted by the judge. In my view, the context in which the statements were made in this case does nothing to alter the meaning ascribed to them by the learned judge.
[49] In so far as it is also said that in considering the meaning of the statements, the judge took into account an irrelevant matter at paragraph 31 of his judgment, namely a paragraph in the appellant’s defence in which he stated that he spoke the words in the belief that the transaction was orchestrated with blatant disregard for the Integrity in Public Life Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act, for the full context, both paragraphs 30 and 31 of the judgment are set out here:
“[30] Dr. Mitchell, in his speech, stated “…[s]ome people are talking corruption”. This statement offers some of the context for the words spoken. Dr. Mitchell was speaking about the actions of some previous Government ministers with respect to the sale of the land. There was an imputation of corruption by those ministers involved in the transaction. An untrue accusation of corruption or corrupt dealings is evidently defamatory since no one would sensibly dispute that such a charge may adversely affect a person’s reputation in his calling or disparage him in his office. To put it in the terminology of the cases, the assertion that former Ministers were corrupt or engaged in corrupt practice(s) are the sort of allegations that tend to lower these former ministers of Government “in the estimation of right thinking members of society”.(Emphasis added)
[31] Dr. Mitchell defended his statements by asserting that “the Defendant spoke the words in the belief that the transaction was orchestrated with blatant disregard for the Integrity in Public Life Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act”. This pleading by Dr. Mitchell further imputes corrupt, unethical and reprehensible conduct by the Cabinet ministers in breach of the laws of Grenada. Therefore, I find that the above meanings are defamatory and/or capable of being defamatory.”
[50] The appellant cites Gatley on Libel and Slander, in support of his argument that this was an error:
“It is clearly established at common law that in determining the meaning of words, the intention and knowledge of the publication are immaterial…what imputation is conveyed by any particular words is to be determined on an objective test, that is, by the meaning in which the ordinary reasonable person would understand them, and it is not to be determined by what the defendant intended to convey.”
[51] What is being said in this extract is that the search for meaning is to discern what the ordinary reasonable person would understand the words to mean and not what meaning the defendant intended to convey. It is an objective test. A defendant’s intention in writing, speaking or publishing the words is also irrelevant to the determination of the questions whether they bear a meaning defamatory of the claimant: E Hulton & Co v Jones. So that, where objectively speaking words are defamatory of a claimant it is immaterial that the defendant did not intend them to be.
[52] However, I do not construe the appellants pleaded words cited by the judge in paragraph 31 as speaking to the appellant’s intention; I understand the appellant to be advancing a reason for uttering the words, namely his “belief that the transaction was orchestrated with blatant disregard for the Integrity in Public Life Act and the Prevention of Corruption Act.”
[53] Even if it could be said that the judge erred in having regard to the appellant’s statement in his defence, it is nonetheless clear to me, that in the underlined words in paragraph 30 the judge had correctly applied the objective test in determining whether the words were defamatory. Accordingly, for all the reasons previously discussed in relation to the process of determining meaning, such an error would not vitiate the meaning ascribed to the words by the learned judge.
Were the words defamatory of the respondent
[54] The judge next considered whether the words were defamatory of the respondent. He found that they were. The complaint against this finding is that the judge erred in law having regard to the irrelevant matters he considered at paragraph 34 in arriving at his conclusion that the reference to “Simmons” in the impugned words was capable of being understood as a reference to the respondent. The impugned part of the judge’s reasoning is in the following passage:
“[34] Further evidence of this conclusion lies in Dr. Mitchell’s fair comment defence when he outlined that Pauline Andrews was Mr. Simmons’ close friend and part of Mr. Simmons’ political campaign. The connection was made to Pauline Andrews, a shareholder of the company, seemingly to bolster Dr. Mitchell’s charge that there was some level of impropriety in the sale transaction. As such, it is somewhat difficult to accept that Dr. Mitchell was not referring to Mr. Simmons in his speech at the town hall meeting.”
[55] The appellant argues that the appellant’s words were not capable of being understood as referring to the respondent because: (i) the respondent referred to “Simmons” and not “Patrick Simmons”, and (ii) the respondent was required to but did not plead and prove by extrinsic evidence that the words used by the appellant are such that they would have led persons acquainted with the respondent to identify him as the person referred to. As such, it is contended that the judge was plainly wrong in finding that the impugned words were defamatory of the respondent.
[56] The judge’s reasons for finding that the words referred to the respondent are expressed at paragraphs 32 to 36:
“[32] The question then arises whether these meanings are defamatory of Mr. Simmons. Learned counsel for Dr. Mitchell, Lawrence Maharaj SC, submits that the words were not capable of being understood as referring to Mr. Simmons since his full name “Patrick Simmons” was not stated or referred to by Dr. Mitchell. Counsel continues that Mr.Simmons has not led any evidence to prove that the words would lead persons acquainted with him to believe that he was the person referred to. I respectfully disagree with these submissions.
[33] Mr. Simmons served as a minister during the 2008-2013 NDC Government when the land was sold to the Government of Grenada. A minister of Government is also a member of the Cabinet. The Cabinet is made up of a limited class or group of people in a small island state like Grenada and as such they can be easily identified by members of the public. Dr. Mitchell’s comments were in reference to the Cabinet. His reference to “Simmons” could only be properly made with respect to the claimant since Mr. Simmons was the only member of Cabinet with that surname. Compounding matters, Dr. Mitchell singled out or identified Peter David. Peter David served with Mr. Simmons as a government minister during the tenure of the very Cabinet to which Dr. Mitchell alluded. Dr. Mitchell imputed corruption to the Cabinet members of the previous Government, save and except Peter David. I find that any reasonable person hearing Dr. Mitchell’s speech in the context in which it was made would conclude that it was the claimant, Mr. Simmons who was implicated.
[34] Further evidence of this conclusion lies in Dr. Mitchell’s fair comment defence when he outlined that Pauline Andrew was Mr. Simmons’ are close friend and part of Mr. Simmons’ political campaign. The connection was made to Pauline Andrews, a shareholder of the company, seemingly to bolster Dr. Mitchell’s charge that there was some level of impropriety in the sale transaction. As such, it is somewhat difficult to accept that Dr. Mitchell was not referring to Mr. Simmons in his speech at the town hall meeting.
[35] I find further that Dr. Mitchell suggested Mr. Simmons’ involvement in the alleged corruption when he made the definitive assertion, “[a]sk Simmons if he wasn’t a member of that company as an example, just ask him.” The effect of this statement was that it identified, singled out or implicated Mr. Simmons, a Cabinet member, as being a member of the company or at the very least someone who benefitted from the alleged corrupt scheme or activity involving the sale of the land.
[36] In view of the foregoing, I find that the offending words uttered by Dr. Mitchell are capable of the meanings ascribed to them by Mr. Simmons and are defamatory of him. I find the offending words were capable of disparaging and did disparage Mr. Simmons in his office as a former Cabinet minister and/or calling as a politician. The question then arises whether the defamatory statements can be defended on grounds of fair comment and qualified privilege.”
Discussion – identification
[57] Words are not actionable in a claim for defamation unless they are published of and concerning the claimant. Where the claimant is clearly identified by name or otherwise clearly identified, little difficulty can arise in concluding that the defamatory words refer to him or her. However, it is not essential that the claimant be named in the statement because in a case where the statement does not expressly refer to the claimant, they may be held to refer to him if reasonable persons to whom the words are published and who have knowledge of special facts could and did understand them to refer to the claimant. Where the claimant intends to rely on such special facts to connect him as the object of the defamatory words, they must be pleaded and proved in evidence: Morgan v Odhams Press Ltd.
[58] The learned authors of Duncan & Neil at paragraph 7.02 provide instructive guidance on the ultimate test where identification of the object of the defamatory words is in issue:
“In every case where identification is in issue the question is: would reasonable people reasonably understand the statement to refer to the claimant? If reasonable people would so understand the statement, the defendant will not escape liability though they may have tried to disguise the reference to the claimant by using initials or asterisks or a fictitious name or some other subterfuge. Nor will they escape liability even if they had never heard of the claimant or intended to refer to someone else.”
[59] It is the role of the trial judge to decide as a matter of law whether the words are reasonably capable of being understood to refer to the claimant. The judge must ask himself whether or not ordinary, reasonable persons, having the knowledge proved, could understand the words to refer to the claimant. If the answer to this question is no, that is the end of the matter: the claimant would have failed to prove that the words referred to him. If, on the other hand, the answer is that the words could reasonably lead people acquainted with the claimant to believe that he was the person referred to, it is open to the judge to find that the words did in fact refer to him.
[60] The appellant’s argument that the words cannot reasonably be understood to refer to the respondent because his full name “Patrick Simmons” was not stated cannot withstand scrutiny in light of the principles stated in the immediately preceding paragraphs. The respondent had averred in his pleadings, and provided evidence in his witness statement, that until the general elections held in Grenada in 2013, he was a senior member of the National Democratic Congress (NDC) political party and Minister for Youth Empowerment and Sports in that last NDC Government. None of this was denied or contradicted by the appellant, who in fact pleaded and relied on said facts in support of his defence. In light of this, it is not particularly clear to me whether identification was truly a live issue in the case. Neither party identified it as such in their respective Pre-Trial Memorandum, which is the document in which each party defines the issues in the case as they see it. Be that as it may, the appellant did deny that he spoke or published the words of or concerning the respondent and the judge was obliged to address the issue of identification.
[61] I find no merit in the appellant’s criticism of the judge’s conclusion on this issue. There was evidence before the judge that the respondent’s surname was Simmons; that he was a Cabinet Minister at the material time; that a Cabinet Minister in the NDC Government at the time of the transaction who bore the name “Simmons” was specifically named by the appellant at the Town Hall meeting; and of all the then Ministers, only Minister “Simmons” was singled out by name.
[62] From the appellant’s words, the ordinary and reasonable Grenadian would have understood that the person to whom the words referred was a person whose surname was “Simmons”, who was a Minister and member of the Cabinet during the 2008-2013 NDC Government when the land was sold to the Government of Grenada. Such a description matches the respondent perfectly. It would be an affront to the common sense of ordinary reasonable Grenadians to contend that the appellant’s reference to a Minister in the NDC government at the time of the transaction with the name “Simmons” was not a reference to Patrick Simmons, the respondent, simply because the appellant did not include his first name in identifying the Minister to whom he was referring. As poignantly highlighted by Mr. John in the respondent’s written submissions, relying on Bourke v Warren:
“The question for [the judge’s] consideration is whether [he] thinks the libel designates the plaintiff in such a way as to let those who knew him understand that he was the person meant. It is not necessary that all the world should understand the libel; it is sufficient if those who knew the plaintiff can make out that he is the person meant.”
[63] I find further, that in such circumstances, and, on these facts, there was no necessity for the respondent to plead and prove any other or further extrinsic facts and evidence to prove identification. The appellant’s naming of the Minister under reference as “Simmons” and associating him with the NDC Cabinet at the time of the transaction was sufficient to provide a basis for reasonable people to reasonably understand the statement to refer to the respondent.
[64] For all the foregoing reasons, I conclude that grounds 1 to 8 are devoid of merit and I would dismiss them.
TO BE CONTINUED

