A high court judge has handed down a 3-year suspended sentence on Grenadian farmer Alfred Lewis in a case involving Maiming.
Lewis had pleaded guilty to committing the offence against a fellow farmer after the two were embroiled in a disagreement over a water supply system to irrigate both of their farms.
The accused used a hatchet to deliver a severe cut on the hand of the other man which resulted in him virtually not being able to use it.
In handing down sentence, Justice Innocent ordered a prison sentence of 3 years He said: “The sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment herein shall not take effect unless, during the period of 3 years from the date sentence is pronounced, the defendant commits another offence punishable with imprisonment and thereafter a court having power to do so orders that the original sentence shall take effect with or without variation of its terms.
“The defendant Mr. Alfred Lewis shall engage in community service by providing assistance to the Grand Bacolet Juvenile Rehabilitation and Treatment Centre for a period of 3 years. Such community service as herein described shall be performed twice weekly and shall be for a duration of at least three (3) hours daily,” he added.
The judge went on to say: “The community service to be performed shall be under the supervision of the Head of Grand Bacolet Juvenile Rehabilitation and Treatment Centre. The Head of the Bacolet Juvenile Rehabilitation and Treatment Centre shall submit a report to the Court every six (6) months relative to the defendant’s performance.”
As a public service, THE NEW TODAY reproduces in full the Justice Innocent ruling:-
[58] Section 78 of the Criminal Code was amended by section 78BB of the Criminal Code (Amendment) Act by inserting the new section which provides that where a court passes on any person a sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than three years for an offence, it may order that the sentence shall not take effect unless, during a period specified in the order, being not less than one year or more than three years from the date of the order, such person commits in Grenada another offence punishable with imprisonment and thereafter a court having power to do so orders that the original sentence shall take effect with or without variations of its terms. The section also defines a suspended sentence thus: “suspended sentence” as respects any offender means a sentence which is ordered pursuant to this section not to take effect unless the offender commits another offence.” Therefore, a suspended sentence may properly be viewed as a sentence of imprisonment.
[59] The difficulty with section 78BB is that it does not provide any guidance to the sentencing court as to when a suspended sentence is appropriate in any given set of circumstances. In the court’s view, the provisions of the Practice Direction supplements section 78BB of the Code.
[60] A suspended sentence should be distinguished from probationary measures. Probation is primarily a rehabilitative sentencing tool. By contrast, a suspended sentence was intended to be punitive in nature. Therefore, suspended sentences should generally include punitive conditions that are restrictive of the offender’s liberty.
[61] No offences are excluded from the suspended sentencing regime. There appear to be no presumptions in favour of or against a suspended sentence for specific offences. Section 78 of the Code lists only one criteria that a court must consider before deciding to impose a suspended sentence, that is, the court must impose a term of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years’ imprisonment.
[62] The Practice Direction provides that a suspended sentence remains a prison sentence and should not be passed unless a term of imprisonment is warranted. It should not be considered another form of non-custodial penalty like probation or community service. It appears that a literal interpretation of this provision in the Practice Direction, presupposes that a sentencing judge must first fix a term of imprisonment that is warranted in the circumstances of the case.
[63] The court has concluded that the requirement in section 78 that the judge impose a sentence of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years does not require the judge to first impose a sentence of imprisonment of a fixed duration before considering whether to impose a suspended sentence. Such an approach in the court’s view is unrealistic and could lead to unfit sentences in some cases. Instead, a purposive interpretation of section 78 should be adopted. The court is also of the view that the same purposive interpretation ought to be given to the above cited provision in the Practice Direction.
[64] A literal reading of section 78BB suggests that the decision to impose a conditional sentence should be made in two distinct stages. In the first stage, the judge should decide the appropriate sentence according to the general purposes and principles of sentencing. Having found that a term of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years is warranted, the judge would then, in a second stage, decide whether this same term should be served in the community according to section 78BB. At first sight, since section 78BB states that the court imposes a sentence of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years’ it seems that the sentencing judge must first impose a term of imprisonment of a fixed duration before contemplating the possibility that this term be served in the community.
[65] In the court’s view, this two-step process does not correspond to the reality of sentencing. In practice, the determination of a term of imprisonment is necessarily intertwined with the decision of where the offender will serve the sentence. A judge does not impose a fixed sentence of “x months” in the abstract, without having in mind where that sentence will be served. Furthermore, when a suspended sentence is chosen, its duration will depend on the type of conditions imposed. Therefore, the duration of the sentence should not be determined separately from the determination of its venue.
[66] There is also a contradiction embedded in this rigid two-step process. After having applied 78BB in the first stage to conclude that the appropriate sentence is a term of imprisonment of a fixed duration (in all cases less than one year or not more than three years), the judge would then have to decide if serving the same sentence in the community is still consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. It is unrealistic to believe that a judge would consider the objectives and principles twice or make a clear distinction in his or her mind between the application of 78BB in the first stage and in the second stage. Even if this could be done, it could lead to what has been described as a “penalogical paradox”.
[67] This second step of the analytical process would effectively compromise the principles of sentencing that led to the imposition of a sentence of imprisonment in the first place. For instance, the principle of proportionality, embedded in section 78BB as the fundamental principle of sentencing, directs that all sentences must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.
[68] Therefore, when a judge in the first stage decides that a term of imprisonment of “x months” is appropriate, it means that this sentence is proportional. If the sentencing judge decides in the second that the same term can be served in the community, it is possible that the sentence is no longer proportional to the gravity of the offence and the responsibility of the offender, since a suspended sentence will generally be more lenient than a jail term of equivalent duration. Thus, such a two-step approach introduces a rigidity in the sentencing process that could lead to an unfit sentence.
[69] Hence, the paradox already identified can be addressed by a purposive interpretation of section 78BB. For the reasons already discussed above, the requirement that the court “imposes a sentence of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years” could not have been intended to impose on judges a rigid two-step process. Rather, it was included to identify the type of offenders who could be entitled to a suspended sentence. At one end of the range, section 78BB denied the possibility of a suspended sentence for offenders who should receive a penitentiary term. At the other end, the section was intended to ensure that offenders who were entitled to a more lenient community measure such as a suspended sentence with or without probation did not receive a sentence of imprisonment, a harsher sanction in the legislative scheme.
[70] This principle was enunciated in R v O’Keefe where it was stated emphatically that suspended sentences should not be given when, but for the power to give a suspended sentence, a probation order was the proper order to make. After all, a suspended sentence is a sentence of imprisonment. The approach recommended in R v O’Keefe was that before one gets to a suspended sentence at all, a court must go through the process of eliminating other possible courses such as absolute discharge, conditional discharge, probation order, fine, and then say to itself: this is a case for imprisonment, and the final question, it being a case for imprisonment: is immediate imprisonment required, or can I give a suspended sentence?
[71] Hence, a purposive interpretation of section 78BB does not dictate a rigid two-step approach in which the judge would first have to impose a term of imprisonment of a fixed duration and then decide if that fixed term of imprisonment can be served in the community. In other words, the requirement that the court must impose a sentence of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than years can be fulfilled by a preliminary determination of the appropriate range of available sentences.
[72] The above-mentioned, approach still requires the judge to proceed in two stages. However, the judge need not impose a term of imprisonment of a fixed duration at the first stage of the analysis. Rather, at this stage, the judge simply has to exclude two possibilities: (a) probationary measures; and (b) a penitentiary term. If either of these sentences is appropriate, then a suspended sentence should not be imposed.
[73] In making this preliminary determination, the judge need only consider the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing to the extent necessary to narrow the range of sentence for the offender. The submissions of the parties, although not binding, may prove helpful in this regard. For example, both parties may agree that the appropriate range of sentence is a term of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years.
[74] Once that preliminary determination is made, the judge should then proceed to the second stage of the analysis that is, determining whether a suspended sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing. Unlike the first stage, the principles of sentencing are now considered comprehensively. Further, it is at the second stage that the duration and venue of the sentence should be determined, and, if a suspended sentence, the conditions to be imposed.
[75] In the final analysis, the overarching duty of a sentencing judge is to draw upon all the legitimate principles of sentencing to determine a “just and appropriate” sentence which reflects the gravity of the offence committed and the moral blameworthiness of the offender.
[76] As a prerequisite to any suspended sentence, the sentencing judge must be satisfied that having the offender serve the sentence in the community would not endanger its safety. If the sentencing judge is not satisfied that the safety of the community can be preserved, a suspended sentence must never be imposed.
[77] The issue here is whether “safety of the community” refers only to the threat posed by the specific offender or whether it also extends to the broader risk of undermining respect for the law. The proponents of the broader interpretation argue that, in certain cases where a conditional sentence could be imposed, it would be perceived that wrongdoers are receiving lenient sentences, thereby insufficiently deterring those who may be inclined to engage in similar acts of wrongdoing, and, in turn, endangering the safety of the community.
[78] In the court’s opinion, to assess the danger to the community posed by the offender while serving his or her sentence in the community, two factors must be taken into account, namely, the risk of the offender re-offending; and the gravity of the damage that could ensue in the event of re-offence. If the judge finds that there is a real risk of re-offence, incarceration should be imposed. Of course, there is always some risk that an offender may re-offend. If the judge thinks this risk is minimal, the gravity of the damage that could follow were the offender to re-offend should also be taken into consideration. In certain cases, the minimal risk of re- offending will be offset by the possibility of a great prejudice, thereby precluding a suspended sentence.
[79] It is suggested that consideration be given to whether the offender has previously complied with court orders and, more generally, to whether the offender has a criminal record that suggests that the offender will not abide by the suspended sentence.
[80] Additional factors that may be of relevance to the court may include the nature of the offence; the relevant circumstances of the offence, which can put in issue prior and subsequent incidents; the degree of participation of the accused; the relationship of the accused with the victim; the profile of the accused, that is, his [or her] occupation, lifestyle, criminal record, family situation, mental state; his [or her] conduct following the commission of the offence; and the danger which the interim release of the accused represents for the community, notably that part of the community affected by the matter. The risk that a particular offender poses to the community must be assessed in each case, on its own facts. Moreover, the factors outlined above should not be applied mechanically.
[81] The risk of re-offence should also be assessed in light of the conditions attached to the sentence. Where an offender might pose some risk of endangering the safety of the community, it is possible that this risk be reduced to a minimal one by the imposition of appropriate conditions to the sentence. Such other reasonable conditions as the court considers desirable for securing the good conduct of the offender and for preventing a repetition by the offender of the same offence or the commission of other offences may be imposed.
[82] In a preliminary determination, the sentencing judge should reject a penitentiary term and probationary measures as inappropriate. Having determined that the appropriate range of sentence is a term of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years, the judge should then consider whether it is appropriate for the offender to serve his or her sentence in the community.
[83] As a corollary of the purposive interpretation of section 78, a suspended sentence need not be of equivalent duration to the sentence of incarceration that would otherwise have been imposed. The sole requirement is that the duration and conditions of a suspended sentence make for a just and appropriate sentence.
[84] The requirement in section 78BB is that the judge be satisfied that the safety of the community would not be endangered by the offender serving his or her sentence in the community is a condition precedent to the imposition of a suspended sentence, and not the primary consideration in determining whether a suspended sentence is appropriate.
[85] In making this determination, the judge should consider the risk posed by the specific offender, not the broader risk of whether the imposition of a suspended sentence would endanger the safety of the community by providing insufficient general deterrence or undermining general respect for the law. Two factors should be taken into account, namely the risk of the offender re-offending; and the gravity of the damage that could ensue in the event of re-offence. A consideration of the risk posed by the offender should include the risk of any criminal activity, and not be limited solely to the risk of physical or psychological harm to individuals.
[86] Once the prerequisites of 78 are satisfied, the judge should give serious consideration to the possibility of a suspended sentence in all cases by examining whether a suspended sentence is consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing.
[87] In the court’s opinion, the Practice Direction encapsulates all of the principles already discussed. In fact, the Practice Direction provides useful guidance to the sentencing court relative to a non-exhaustive list of factors that the sentencing court should take into account when exercising its discretion whether or not to impose a suspended sentence.
[88] The Practice Direction provides that the court may consider the following non-exhaustive list of factors in exercising its discretion whether to impose a suspended sentence: (1) whether an appropriate punishment can only be achieved by an immediate custodial sentence; (2) whether the offender presents a risk or danger to the public or to the victim; (3) whether the offender has a history of poor compliance with court orders; (4) whether there is a realistic prospect of rehabilitation; (5) If sentencing a person under 21, whether there is a realistic prospect that incarceration will so affect an offender as to turn that person more towards criminality and less toward rehabilitation; (6) whether there is strong personal mitigation; and (7) What will be the impact of an immediate custodial sentence on dependent relatives, employees, and the community?
[89] In the court’s view, the factors highlighted by the Practice Direction are consistent with the permissible aims and principles of sentencing. Therefore, there appears to be no reason to depart from the Guidelines once the Practice Direction is applied correctly. In the premises, there is no need to depart from the Guidelines in the manner suggested by Mr. Fergusson KC. What is required, in the court’s opinion, is whether the Guideline is applicable to the present case, and by extension the Practice Direction.
[90] A suspended sentence can provide significant denunciation and deterrence. As a general matter, the more serious the offence, the longer and more onerous the suspended sentence should be. There may be some circumstances, however, where the need for denunciation or deterrence is so pressing that incarceration will be the only suitable way in which to express society’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct or to deter similar conduct in the future.
[91] Generally, a suspended sentence will be better than incarceration at achieving the restorative objectives of rehabilitation, reparations to the victim and the community, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgment of the harm done to the victim and the community.
[92] Where a combination of both punitive and restorative objectives may be achieved, a suspended sentence will likely be more appropriate than incarceration. Where objectives such as denunciation and deterrence are particularly pressing, incarceration will generally be the preferable sanction. This may be so notwithstanding the fact that restorative goals might be achieved.
[93] However, a suspended sentence may provide sufficient denunciation and deterrence, even in cases in which restorative objectives are of lesser importance, depending on the nature of the conditions imposed, the duration of the sentence, and the circumstances of both the offender and the community in which the suspended sentence is to be served. A suspended sentence may be imposed even where there are aggravating circumstances, although the need for denunciation and deterrence will increase in these circumstances.
[94] No party is under a burden of proof to establish that a suspended sentence is either appropriate or inappropriate in the circumstances. The judge should consider all relevant evidence, no matter by whom it is adduced. However, it would be in the offender’s best interests to establish elements militating in favour of a suspended sentence. Sentencing judges have a wide discretion in the choice of the appropriate sentence. They are entitled to considerable deference from appellate courts. Absent an error in principle, failure to consider a relevant factor, or an overemphasis of the appropriate factors, a court of appeal should only intervene to vary a sentence imposed at trial if the sentence is demonstrably unfit.
[95] The suspended sentence is therefore a meaningful alternative to incarceration for less serious and non-dangerous offenders. The offenders who meet the criteria of 78BB will serve a sentence under strict surveillance in the community instead of going to prison. These offenders’ liberty could be constrained by conditions attached to the sentence. In case of breach of conditions, the offender will be brought back before a judge. If an offender cannot provide a reasonable excuse for breaching the conditions of his or her sentence, the judge may order him or her to serve the remainder of the sentence in jail, hence there is a real threat of incarceration to increase compliance with the conditions of the sentence.
[97] In the court’s view, while the gravity of such offences is clearly relevant to determining whether a suspended sentence is appropriate in the circumstances, it would be both unwise and unnecessary to establish judicially created presumptions that suspended sentences are inappropriate for specific offences.
[98] Offence-specific presumptions introduce unwarranted rigidity in the determination of whether a suspended sentence is a just and appropriate sanction. Such presumptions do not accord with the principle of proportionality and the value of individualization in sentencing, nor are they necessary to achieve the important objectives of uniformity and consistency in the use of suspended sentences.
[99] Sentencing is an individualized process, in which the sentencing judge has considerable discretion in fashioning a fit sentence. The rationale behind this approach stems from the principle of proportionality, the fundamental principle of sentencing, which provides that a sentence must be proportional to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. Proportionality requires an examination of the specific circumstances of both the offender and the offence so that the “punishment fits the crime”. As a by-product of such an individualised approach, there will be inevitable variation in sentences imposed for particular crimes.
[100] It has been repeatedly stressed that there is no such thing as a uniform sentence for a particular crime. Sentencing is an inherently individualised process, and the search for a single appropriate sentence for a similar offender and a similar crime will frequently be a fruitless exercise of academic abstraction. As well, sentences for a particular offence should be expected to vary to some degree across various communities and regions in this jurisdiction, as the “just and appropriate” mix of accepted sentencing goals will depend on the needs and current conditions of and in the particular community where the crime occurred.
[101] Therefore, the suggestion that the proportionality principle presumptively excludes certain offences from the suspended sentencing regime espouses an approach that focuses inordinately on the gravity of the offence and insufficiently on the moral blameworthiness of the offender. This fundamentally misconstrues the nature of the principle. Proportionality requires that full consideration be given to both factors. The particular circumstances of the offender and the offence must be considered in each case.
[102] An individualised sentencing regime will of necessity entail a certain degree of disparity in sentence. Sentencing Guidelines which mandate the establishment of “starting point sentences” may be set out as guides to sentencing courts in order to achieve greater uniformity and consistency. However, the court is also acutely aware of the need to provide guidance to sentencing courts regarding the use of the suspended sentence, as it is a new sanction in some jurisdictions which has created a considerable amount of controversy and confusion in its short life.
[103] That said, the court does not think it necessary to resort to “starting points” in respect of specific offences to provide guidance as to the proper use of suspended sentences. In the court’s view, the risks posed by starting points, in the form of offence-specific presumptions in favour of incarceration, outweigh their benefits. Starting points are most useful in circumstances where there is the potential for a large disparity between sentences imposed for a particular crime because the range of sentence set out in the Code is particularly broad.
[104] In the case of suspended sentences, however, the operation of section 78BB considerably narrows the range of cases in which a suspended sentence may be imposed. A suspended sentence may only be imposed on non-dangerous offenders who would otherwise have received a jail sentence of not less than one year and not more than three years. Accordingly, the potential disparity of sentence between those offenders who were candidates for a suspended sentence and received a jail term, and those who received a suspended sentence, is relatively small.
[105] Given the narrow range of application for suspended sentences, the court is of the opinion that a consideration of the principles of sentencing themselves, without offence-specific presumptions, can provide sufficient guidance as to whether a suspended sentence should be imposed. Some principles militate in favour of a suspended sentence, whereas others favour incarceration. It is the task of the sentencing court to articulate, in general terms, which principles favour each sanction. Although it cannot ensure uniformity of result, the articulation of these principles can at least ensure uniformity in approach to the imposition of suspended sentences.
Retribution
[106] The principle aim of retribution is to register society’s denunciation for the criminal conduct engaged in by the offender. Denunciation is the communication of society’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should be punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law. As Lord Justice Lawton stated in R.v. Sargeant “society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types of crime, and the only way in which the courts can show this is by the sentences they pass”.
[107] Incarceration will usually provide more denunciation than a suspended sentence, as a suspended sentence is generally a more lenient sentence than a jail term of equivalent duration. However, as the court has already observed, a suspended sentence can still provide a significant amount of denunciation. This is particularly so when onerous conditions are imposed and the duration of the suspended sentence is extended beyond the duration of the jail sentence that would ordinarily have been imposed in the circumstances. First, the conditions should have a punitive aspect. Indeed, the need for punitive conditions is the reason why a probationary sentence was rejected and a sentence of imprisonment of not less than one year and not more than three years imposed.
[108] Second, although a literal reading of section 78BB suggests that a suspended sentence must be of equivalent duration to the jail term that would otherwise have been imposed, the court has already explained earlier why such a literal interpretation of section 78BB should be eschewed. Instead, the preferred approach is to have the judge reject a probationary sentence and a penitentiary term as inappropriate in the circumstances, and then consider whether a suspended sentence of not less than one year and not more than three years would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. This approach does not require that there be any equivalence between the duration of the suspended sentence and the jail term that would otherwise have been imposed. The sole requirement is that the duration and conditions of a suspended sentence make for a just and appropriate sentence.
[109] The stigma of a suspended sentence with attached conditions should not be underestimated. Living in the community under strict conditions where fellow residents are well aware of the offender’s criminal misconduct can provide ample denunciation in many cases. In certain circumstances, the shame of encountering members of the community may make it even more difficult for the offender to serve his or her sentence in the community than in prison.
[110] The amount of denunciation provided by a suspended sentence will be heavily dependent on the circumstances of the offender, the nature of the conditions imposed, and the community in which the sentence is to be served. As a general matter, the more serious the offence and the greater the need for denunciation, the longer and more onerous the conditional sentence should be. However, there may be certain circumstances in which the need for denunciation is so pressing that incarceration will be the only suitable way in which to express society’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct.
Deterrence
[111] A suspended sentence can provide significant deterrence if sufficiently punitive conditions are imposed and the public is made aware of the severity of these sentences. There is also the possibility of deterrence through the use of community service orders, including those in which the offender may be obliged to speak to members of the community about the evils of the particular criminal conduct in which he or she engaged, assuming the offender were amenable to such a condition. Nevertheless, there may be circumstances in which the need for deterrence will warrant incarceration. This will depend in part on whether the offence is one in which the effects of incarceration are likely to have a real deterrent effect, as well as on the circumstances of the community in which the offences were committed.
Conclusions
[112] In sum, in determining whether a suspended sentence would be consistent with the fundamental purposes and principles of sentencing, the sentencing court should consider which sentencing objectives figure most prominently in the factual circumstances of the particular case before it.
[113] Where a combination of both punitive and restorative objectives may be achieved, a suspended sentence will likely be more appropriate than incarceration. In determining whether restorative objectives can be satisfied in a particular case, the judge should consider the offender’s prospects of rehabilitation, including whether the offender has proposed a particular plan of rehabilitation; the availability of appropriate community service and treatment programs; whether the offender has acknowledged his or her wrongdoing and expresses remorse; as well as the victim’s wishes as revealed by the victim impact statement. This list is not exhaustive.
[114] Where punitive objectives such as denunciation and deterrence are particularly pressing, such as cases in which there are aggravating circumstances, incarceration will generally be the preferable sanction. This may be so notwithstanding the fact that restorative goals might be achieved by a suspended sentence. Conversely, a suspended sentence may provide sufficient denunciation and deterrence, even in cases in which restorative objectives are of diminished importance, depending on the nature of the conditions imposed, the duration of the suspended sentence, and the circumstances of the offender and the community in which the conditional sentence is to be served.
[115] Finally, it bears pointing out that a suspended sentence may be imposed even in circumstances where there are aggravating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender. Aggravating circumstances will obviously increase the need for denunciation and deterrence. However, it would be a mistake to rule out the possibility of a suspended sentence ab initio simply because aggravating factors are present. The court repeats that each case must be considered individually.
[116] The suspended sentence incorporates some elements of non-custodial measures and some others of incarceration. Because it is served in the community, it will generally be more effective than incarceration at achieving the restorative objectives of rehabilitation, reparations to the victim and community, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender. However, it is also a punitive sanction capable of achieving the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. It is this punitive aspect that distinguishes the conditional sentence from probation, and it is to this issue that the court will now turn.
Probation order inappropriate
[117] There is a difference between a suspended sentence and a probationary sentence. While a suspended sentence with probation is primarily a rehabilitative sentencing tool a suspended sentence addresses both punitive and rehabilitative objectives. On their face, these differences do not suggest that a suspended sentence is more punitive than a probation order. Moreover, the penalty for breach of probation is potentially more severe than that for breach of a suspended sentence. Pursuant to the Probation Act, breach of probation constitutes a new offence, punishable by imprisonment, while a breach of a suspended does not constitute a new offence per se. The aforementioned observations are clearly disclosed by the provisions of sections 7 and 8 of the Probation Act. Section 7 of the Probation Act deals with the consequences of the Breach of a probation order. Section 8 of the Probation Act deals with a situation when an offender commits a further offence while a probation order is still operative.
[118] Section 9 of the Probation Act deals with the effect of a probation order. Section 9(1) provides that subject as hereinafter provided, a conviction of an offence for which an order is made under this Part placing the offender on probation shall be deemed not to be a conviction for any purpose other than the purposes of the proceedings in which the order is made and of any subsequent proceedings which may be taken against the offender under the foregoing provisions of this Act: Provided that where an offender, being not less than seventeen years of age at the time of his or her conviction of an offence for which he or she is placed on probation, is subsequently sentenced under this Part for that offence, the provisions of this subsection shall cease to apply to the conviction.
[119] In light of the foregoing, it is clear that Parliament intended a suspended sentence to be more punitive than a probationary sentence, notwithstanding the similarities between the two sanctions in respect of their rehabilitative purposes. Therefore, suspended sentences were designed to “permit the accused to avoid imprisonment but not to avoid punishment”.
Disposition
[120] In the premises, the court has given due consideration to the question of whether the imposition of an alternative sentence whether in the form of probation or a suspended sentence would serve the meaningful aims of punishment in the present case; and also the question of whether in this way the aims of restorative justice can be achieved.
[121] The law does not appear to attribute to either party the onus of establishing that the offender should or should not receive a suspended sentence. To inform his or her decision about the appropriate sentence, the sentencing judge can take into consideration all the evidence, no matter who adduces it.
[122] In matters of sentencing, while each party is expected to establish elements in support of its position as to the appropriate sentence that should be imposed, the ultimate decision as to what constitutes the best disposition is left to the discretion of the sentencing judge.
[123] The court will now apply the principles discussed above to the present case.
[124] In assessing seriousness by reference to the consequences and harm done the court took into account the physical harm done to the victim which can be evidenced by the resulting disability which the victim suffered. It appears that the victim now has a permanently deformed right hand which has obviously diminished his ability to utilise same in conducting the affairs of his daily life. It is fair to say that this disability must be a source of embarrassment to the victim. The court also took into account the pain and fear which the victim must have experienced having witnessed the partial amputation of his right hand unexpectedly and in the circumstances in which it was done. Additionally, recovery from such an injury must have involved the victim experiencing pain and disability after surgical intervention and during the period of recuperation.
[125] The attack on the victim was to some extent provoked but seemed to have been based purely, if we accept the defendant’s explanation, upon suspicion. There was however no degree of premeditation involved.
[126] The court having determined the appropriate sentence considered the aggravating and mitigating factors present in the case. The court was able to discern the following aggravating factors in the present case. The defendant was clearly motivated by his suspicion that the victim had interfered with his irrigation system. The vicious and brazen attack upon the victim although perpetrated upon the defendant’s land occurred in the presence of others. Additionally, the implement used was a machete. Our experience in this jurisdiction has taught us that a machete is a brutal and dangerous weapon when wielded in the wrong hands.
[127] The court did not find the existence of any mitigating factors in the commission of the offence save and except that there appeared on the facts placed before the court that both the defendant and the virtual complainant were both armed with cutlasses at the material time. In addition, it appeared that this was a situation where at one point the defendant and the virtual complainant appeared to have been engaged in a physical altercation or scuffle. Mr. Fergusson KC in his submissions to the court suggested that this may very well have been a case of excessive self-defense.
[128] In the circumstances, the court finds that in the present case the aggravating factors relative to the commission of the offence are far outweighed by the mitigating factors.
[129] The court was unable to make a thorough assessment relative to matters of personal mitigation in the case of the defendant; save and except that the defendant in this case has no previous convictions for any offence and is generally a man of good character and good standing in the community. In the circumstances, there appears to be no need to consider the question of rehabilitation relative to this offender. There is no evidence that the defendant poses a real risk of offending or re-offending or that he is a danger to the community or the victim. The court has also taken into account the defendant’s age and his familial arrangements.
[130] Given the discourse that the court has engaged relative to the question of restorative justice, the court has formed the view that a probation order would not serve the aims of punishment in the present case. The court is of the view that there is the need to register denunciation for the commission of the offence by ensuring that there is a punitive aspect to the sentence imposed by the court on the offender. The court is of the view that such an objective cannot be obtained by the imposition of a probation order. Therefore, the court is minded to impose a suspended sentence coupled with a community service order.
Sentence
[131] Therefore, the court’s sentence is as follows:
(1) The defendant is sentenced to 3 years’ imprisonment which shall be suspended for a period of 3 years. The sentence of 3 years’ imprisonment herein shall not take effect unless, during the period of 3 years from the date sentence is pronounced, the defendant commits another offence punishable with imprisonment and thereafter a court having power to do so orders that the original sentence shall take effect with or without variation of its terms.
(2) The defendant Mr. Alfred Lewis shall engage in community service by providing assistance to the Grand Bacolet Juvenile Rehabilitation and Treatment Centre for a period of 3 years commencing from 31st July 2024. Such community service as herein described shall be performed twice weekly and shall be for a duration of at least three (3) hours daily. The community service to be performed shall be under the supervision of the Head of Grand Bacolet Juvenile Rehabilitation and Treatment Centre.
(3) The Head of the Bacolet Juvenile Rehabilitation and Treatment Centre shall submit a report to the Court every six (6) months relative to the defendant’s performance.
(4) Should the defendant fail to adhere to the terms of the community service order he shall be brought back to Court for the purpose of the Court determining whether and in what manner the defendant shall be dealt with in accordance with law and whether there ought to be any extension of the community service order.
Shawn Innocent
High Court Judge
By the Court
Registrar

